Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
2008

Essays on taxation and space
Justin M. Ross
West Virginia University

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Ross, Justin M., "Essays on taxation and space" (2008). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem
Reports. 2716.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/2716

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses,
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU.
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

Essays on Taxation and Space
Justin M. Ross
Dissertation submitted to the
College of Business and Economics
at West Virginia University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics
Santiago Pinto, Ph.D., Chair
John Blair, Ph.D.
Brian Cushing, Ph.D.
Stratford Douglas, Ph.D.
Russell Sobel, Ph.D.
Department of Economics
Morgantown, West Virginia
2008

Keywords: Spatial Econometrics, Property Tax Assessment,
Income Tax Responsiveness, Tenure Choice
Copyright 2008 Justin M. Ross

Abstract
ESSAYS ON TAXATION AND SPACE
Justin M. Ross
This dissertation is composed of three essays in which each examine the response to taxation
while carefully considering the role of space. In the first essay, I examine the behavior
of property tax assessors among local governments to uncover sources of assessment bias.
While typically not a formulator of policy, property assessors are likely sensitive to political
incentives as they are either directly elected to their office or appointed by another elected
official. This essay searches for sources of this pressure via its influence on the assessment-tosale price ratio from Virginia cities and counties in 2004. Among the more significant findings
are that elected assessors underassess property more than their appointed counterparts, that
assessors attempt to export the property tax onto commercial property, fiscal stress tends
to induce higher assessments, and positive spatial autocorrelation exists suggesting that
residents look to their neighbors in determining the accuracy of their assessments.
The second essay examines the responsiveness of the rich to state income taxes. Since
distance is likely a relatively small transaction cost for high-income groups, states with
greater personal income taxes are likely assuming larger deadweight losses or shifting the
burden to the corporate sector. We use MLB free agents who were named All-Stars at some
point in their career and who signed with a U.S. team for the 1991 through 2002 seasons.
This data set overcomes some of the previous difficulties encountered in similar studies but
also has limitations representing the general rich population. We find evidence that the wages
of this subset of players do adjust to offset the burden of state income taxes, specifically a
one percent decrease in net-of-tax rate leads to a 3.3 percent increase in salary.
The final essay examines the spatial tenure choice decision, i.e. the dual decision of where
to live as well as whether to rent or own. While previous literature has looked these decisions
in isolation from each other, our work is the first to combine the decision without making
assumptions about preferences, amenities, or zoning. Our model focuses on the trade-off
between transportation costs, maintenance costs, the tax treatment of housing, and end-oflife wealth as points of consideration. We also extend the model to incorporate different
income groups in which wealthier households receive larger tax savings from ownership. To
contrast our model with reality, we offer an empirical analysis of the spatial tenure choice
using a multinomial logit regression.
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Chapter 1
Purpose and Agenda
The role of space forms the basis of the literature in urban and regional economics and is increasingly finding its way into public finance. Space is recognized among regional economists
as a source of monopoly power for firms as well as a cost that constrains the mobility of
individuals. Similarly, the public choice literature has cited restrictions on citizen mobility
as the basis of constitutional strength in government to behave as a leviathan with redistributive taxes. It is only natural that the public finance literature should begin to devote
more attention to the implications of taxation over space. It is in this manner that my
dissertation will contribute to the science of economics.
In Chapter 2, I set out initially to discover if the appointment-type for assessors of property plays a role in the accuracy of the assessment. It is clear from descriptive analysis of the
data that both assessor types are underassessing, but it is not clear if one type underassesses
more than the other after controlling for various social and economic characteristics of the
jurisdictions. While it seems that directly elected assessors would have a sufficiently strong
incentive to underassess their constituents, it is also possible that assessors appointed by
elected officials are not any less susceptible to political pressure. Alternatively, one could
easily think of a model where appointed assessors serve as a convenient scapegoat for elected
officials to raise tax revenue with higher assessments without changing the tax code. Virginia
1

serves as an excellent basis to test for differences in assessor type, as they are one of the few
states that have a mix of appointed and elected assessors at the county level.
Assessor behavior likely has an important spatial dimension to it, however, as a map of
the Median Assessment-to-Sales Price (A/S) Ratio among Virginia’s counties demonstrates
that there exists direct spatial correlation between the assessors’ jurisdictions. Intuitively,
it is appealing to think that if a homeowner does not observe rising property valuations in
neighboring counties, then they will hold greater expectations for their own assessments to
remain constant. This should translate into homeowners exhibiting greater pressure on their
own assessor not to increase their assessment.
To test for assessor incentives in property assessment, I use the A/S Ratio for Virginia
counties in 2004 calculated by the Virginia Department of Taxation (2006). This data allows
for a direct comparison to be made for differences in the level of the A/S ratio after controlling
for social and economic characteristics that may be correlated with political pressure on the
assessor’s office. In addition, this essay will also control for spatial autocorrelation with
Bayesian estimation techniques. In the few previous papers that examine assessor type, this
is a control that has either not been included or has been included improperly.
Chapter 3 looks at a labor response to taxation, specifically highly skilled labor responding to state-level income taxation. There is little dispute in public finance over the long-run
inability of states to redistribute income with taxation. The intuition follows that if State
A raises their income tax, labor will exit to state B until pre-tax income adjusts to where
net income is the same in both locations. The reason this is an expected outcome of the
long-run is because by definition the properties of space that serve as mobility constraints
are non-existent.
Nonetheless, states not only engage in income taxation, but they pursue progressive
taxation and often target the most affluent residents. In this chapter, Robert Dunn and I
present evidence using Major League Free Agent All-Stars that the most affluent are highly
2

elastic to such taxes.1 The difficulty with research on the rich is that by definition they are a
small group, meaning limited sample sizes, and they can claim residency in many alternative
locations come tax season. Thus, even if we observe a rich citizen living in a given state, it
may not be where they file their taxes. As we will discuss, baseball players do not have this
ability to claim residence anywhere other than the home city of their team. This means they
will shift the burden of the income tax onto the signing team in the form of higher gross
salaries and allows us to measure their aversion to taxation in those states.
In Chapter 4, Santiago Pinto and I present a new theoretical model where households
make the joint choice of where to live and whether to own or rent, a decision we refer
to as their spatial tenure choice. The preferential tax treatment of home ownership in the
United States has received a great deal of criticism for merely encouraging the higher income
groups to purchase more housing rather than increasing the home-ownership rate. It has also
received part of the blame for urban density decline and suburban sprawl. The reasoning
behind this criticism lies in the progressive marginal income tax brackets. Since higher
income groups are taxed at higher rates on the margin, a given dollar of housing expenditure
on mortgage interest has a larger tax savings than for a lower income group. Furthermore,
the tax savings only accrues to those who choose to itemize their tax deductions, which is
less likely for those in the lower income tax brackets. The expected result is high-income
houses moving further from the city to purchase larger homes.
We model this behavior by considering a representative household maximizing utility
over two income-earning periods. They must consume housing and may borrow against
second-period income when choosing to own. While owning, they receive preferential tax
treatment in the form of deducting their mortgage interest from taxable first-period income.
However, they must pay maintenance costs to retain or improve housing quality. If they
rent, they neither face maintenance costs nor receive tax savings. In addition, if they choose
to locate in the suburbs over the city, they pay transportation costs.
1
I am the first author on this paper and Robert has agreed that the paper could be included in my
dissertation.

3

In equilibrium, households will determine a reservation price for a unit of housing for
each spatial-tenure choice that leaves them indifferent at all outcomes for a given level
of income. The metropolitan layout by spatial tenure choice will then be determined by
landlords who supply that tenure choice at each location according to the group whose
reservation price is the highest. Once this baseline model is established, we may examine its
comparative statics and discuss possible extensions. To help motivate possible extensions,
we also provide empirical estimates from a multinomial logit regression on observed spatial
tenure choice across metropolitan areas.
This dissertation concludes in Chapter 5 with a summary of the major results found in
each of the essays. Furthermore, there will be a discussion of future recommendations for
furthering the inclusion of space in considering tax policy.

4

Chapter 2
Assessor Incentives and Property
Assessment
1

Introduction

The taxation of property is one of the most important sources of tax revenue in local public
finance. According to the U.S. Census of Governments, local governments collected 46.2
percent of their tax revenue from the taxation of their residents’ property in the 2004 fiscal
year. This is a much larger share than any other form of taxation, and is critical to the
provision of local public goods such as education. Yet it’s widely accepted that the property
tax is among the most disliked of taxes.1 This is particularly true during periods of rising
real-estate prices when the level of taxation does not necessarily correspond with the income
growth of the homeowners, leading them to express feelings of “being taxed out of their
homes.” Property tax assessors and their methodologies often become the target of this
frustration, causing them to become the focus of taxpayer pressure to reduce the burden.2
Furthermore, depending on the jurisdiction, property assessors may be elected directly by
1

See “The Worst Tax? A History of the Property Tax in America” by Fisher (1996) for arguments as to
why property taxes carry so much disdain.
2
For examples in the news, see Gardner (2006), Joravsky (2005) and Geist (1981) for coverage of homeowner’s pressuring the assessor’s office in periods of rising property values.
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the local constituency or appointed to this office by another elected official which suggests
there is an incentive for incumbent officials facing reelection to underassess property values
to lower the effective tax burden of their constituency in a vote-seeking effort.
If assessors are not appraising property at their true market value and instead are appealing to a political constituency, there are a variety of implications. In terms of equity,
assessors may discriminate between household or property types for underassessment and
alter the incidence of the property tax burden along a dimension of political power. This
would be particularly true if assessors compensate the underassessment of one household
type with the overassessment of another, which they would have an incentive to do if they
are required to comply with the International Association of Assessing Officer (IAAO) standards or other state rules of a similar nature.3 Black (1977) has found that effective property
taxes in 1960 Boston were more regressive than were previously thought after it was taken
into account that assessors tended to understate the value of property at the higher end of
the market.
Furthermore, underassessment creates distortions in the voters’ choices when ordering
preferences on statewide property tax legislation if they do not bear the full burden of the
bill. Several states use the level of assessed property values as the measure of ability-to-pay
in their school district aid formulas of state funding. For example, West Virginia’s school-aid
formula increases the level of state funding to the school district if they have a decrease in the
value of their assessed property. So in West Virginia, which strictly uses elected assessors,
if the assessor lowers his appraisal he not only culls favor from his constituency for reducing
their individual tax burden but he also increases their state funding.
However, even if the assessor is appointed, it is not clear that they will not just be
pressured by their elected appointer to underassess constituent property. In The Role of the
States in Strengthening the Property Tax, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (1963) dismissed the issue of appointed versus elected assessors on the point that
3
The IAAO standards require that assessors error on average by no more than 10 percent above or below
fair market value in their assessments (1999).
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they may be equally susceptible to political pressure. Though indirect, it could be true that
the voters would just take their complaints to the elected official that appoints the assessor,
who then could pressure the assessor to lower property assessments. Alternatively, one could
easily think of a model where appointed assessors serve as a convenient scapegoat for elected
officials to raise tax revenue with higher assessments rather than increasing the property tax
rate. These types of incentives have led other researchers, such as Johnson (1989), to view
them as maximizing political support regardless of whether they are elected or appointed.
For instance, they would like to receive the mayor’s endorsement if they are running for
office, which frequently implies providing enough revenue to support local public goods and
services.
They also do not want to draw attention from the state, which gets involved when there is
any centralized aspect of the property tax. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relation’s (1963, Vol. 2, p.107) cite Jack Holmes, the Chief Tax Commissioner as stating
the following:
If, as some claim the State again is in a finance crisis involving schools and local
units of government, there would seem to be two alternatives. First, the State
can continue as it has been to increase the percentage of funds derived by State
taxation and administrative efforts. . . Or, second, it can move to bolster locally
derived revenues. In this case it would inevitably have to remind the local units
of government, that they must expend much more energy on the property tax.
The purpose of this paper is to test for sources of political pressure as well as a difference in the level of assessment between appointed and elected property tax assessors. To
do this, I use the median assessment-to-sales price ratio (sales ratio) for Virginia counties
and independent cities calculated by the Virginia Department of Taxation (2006b) as the
dependent variable. Virginia is one of the few states that implements both appointed and
elected assessors, which allows for a direct comparison of the types on the level of the sales
ratio. The results indicate that elected assessors do underassess constituent property more
7

than their appointed counterparts by about four percent. In addition, it is discovered that
higher shares of commercial property, and fiscal stress in a district lead to higher sales ratios. Higher assessment of business property is likely an attempt to export the tax burden
onto non-voters. Unlike previous research, this paper controls for the presence of spatial
autocorrelation with the Spatial Durbin Model, which implements a spatial lag on both the
dependent variable and the regressors. This reveals that counties either engage in spatial
competition or, more likely, that residents use neighboring counties as a basis of comparison
for the accuracy of their own assessments. Also, a positive correlation between the sales
ratio and spatially lagged commercial property demonstrates that the ability of assessors to
export the property tax burden is severely limited by the presence of available commercial
property in neighboring districts.

2

Previous Research

The political economy issues for local governments have by no means received a lack of
attention from economists, especially concerning the role of local property taxes. Fischel
(2001b) supplied what he termed a ”homevoter model” where zoning combined with local
property taxes that serve as benefit taxes lead to the most efficient provision of local public
goods when compared with state level provision. Since present property values quickly
capitalize the expected future value of amenities such as local public goods, Glaeser (1995)
argues that even myopic politicians have the incentive to consider long-run implications of
public goods that are funded by property taxes. What is interesting in the role of the assessor
here is the ability of political pressure to undermine these incentives. While a local voter
may vote for community level property taxes set to some ideal level that corresponds with
their demand for local public goods, their individual incentive to minimize their personal
tax burden can be achieved by pressuring the local assessors office. For this reason, there
are a number of regulatory oversight groups, both state and local, that restrain the assessors
8

ability to drastically underassess property.
To illustrate these conflicting tensions, Johnson (1989) provides a behavioral model where
the assessor maximizes wealth from office by gaining political support subject to those regulatory constraints. This is modeled differently for appointed and elected assessors because
they are concerned with different constituent bases. In the case of the assessor appointed
by someone in a different political office, they maximize political support by serving as
scapegoats and assessing at higher values so that their appointers raise revenues without the
political fallout of higher taxes. The elected assessors, on the other hand, maximize political support by providing as much tax relief as possible by lowering assessments among the
parcels. In either case, the presence of commercial property allows for assessors to export
the tax and allows them to further raise revenues and meet in compliance for regulatory
constraints surrounding the level of assessment.
Interestingly, the Johnson (1989) model makes this assumption regarding differential
treatment of elected and appointed assessors in spite of a long standing disregard of the issue. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1963), whose report seems
to have driven much of the research over the following decades, had disregarded any differences due to political pressure on the grounds that constituents could just as easily pressure
the appointers for lower assessments. This view holds some empirical support in the previous literature. There has been considerable attention paid in the recent literature on the
policy restraints on rising local property taxes during the rapid acceleration of housing prices
around the U.S. at the turn of the 21st century (Bowman, 2006; Cornia and Walters, 2006).
Since these policy changes are prescribed by lawmakers rather than assessors, there is likely
some credence to the idea that appointers can request their assessors to lower the level of assessment. Since both conflicting propositions regarding the incentives of appointed assessors
have intuitive appeal, their susceptibility to political pressure from the local constituency to
underassess is primarily an empirical question.
When differences in the assessor type has risen in the empirical literature it has almost
9

entirely focused on its influence on horizontal equity via uniformity measures, almost exclusively the coefficient of dispersion (COD). Lowery (1984) found that uniformity erodes
under fiscal stress and tax limitations when the assessor is elected, but strengthens under
appointed assessors. Strauss and Sullivan (1998) tested the influence of several indicators
of assessor authority, state requirements, the level of government responsible for assessment,
and assessor type on the level of uniformity. They found that elected assessors had higher
levels of uniformity, but that its effect diminished as the office moved further away from being
elected at the local level to the county or state level. Bowman and Mikesell (1989) in testing
for determinants of real property assessment uniformity in Virginia found the inclusion of
an indicator variable for assessor type to be insignificant.
Unfortunately the COD tells us nothing about the proclivity of an assessor to engage
in any form of systematic bias (Stewart, 1977). This is due to the fact that the COD
serves a measure of dispersion around the localities’ own median sales ratio, but does not
indicate whether or not that median ratio is at the required level. In order to directly test
for characteristics that influence the degree of underassessment, the sales ratio is the most
relevant available measure. Literature using this statistic as the dependent variable is almost
non-existent. Footnote 9 of Bowman and Mikesell (1989) mentions that an attempt to use
the sales ratio instead of the COD carried an R2 of just 0.04 with no significance in any
explanatory variables, including assessor type. Yet the intention of that work was to look
for factors influencing the dispersion of the sales ratio, not the level of the sales ratio itself.
As a result, the regressors consist of factors that might affect the ability of an assessor to
accurately assess property, such as whether or not the assessor was full or part time, level
of assessor certification, and availability of assessment maps. While we would expect these
variables to affect the variance of a measure, it should not affect the expected value of the
sales ratio absent any systematic bias. In other words, explanatory variables controlling for
the level of difficulty do not explain why the degree of error always lands on the side of being
below true market value.
10

Lowery (1982) is the only previous paper I am aware of that has used the sales ratio as
the dependent variable. The regressions are based on a mail survey of Michigan assessors
and employ ordinary least squares (OLS) on a variety of variables that primarily control
for factors that proxy for the difficulty of assessment, as well as an indicator for whether or
not the assessor was appointed. The overall work of the paper is insightful and very good,
but the shortcoming of the paper is that the econometric model starts from the perspective
that underassessment is the result of poor information. The author then starts searching for
variables indicating information quality that might lead to higher sales ratios (i.e. certification, availability of tax maps, computers, etc). As in Bowman and Mikesell (1989), these
are factors that would influence the dispersion of assessments, but not cause a systematic
bias. Instead of variables that would improve information, there should be variables that
constrain the ability of the assessor to maintain the mandated sales ratio. Secondly, the
inclusion of a political “cuetaking” variable is described as the average sales ratio of neighboring jurisdictions. This is what a standardized spatial weight matrix accomplishes, but
the spatial econometrics field was not well established among general practitioners at the
time. It is now known that using the spatial lag of the dependent variable with OLS leads
to biased and inconsistent estimates (Anselin, 1988).
The contribution to this literature in this paper is a proper specification of the econometric model by estimating the influence of political pressure indicators on the sales ratio.
Also, I use recent advances in spatial econometrics to get an accurate read on the influence
of neighboring jurisdictions.

3

Data and Methodology

The econometric model will be the Spatial Durbin model described in vector form by Anselin
(1988) as
R = Xβ + (I − ρW )−1 e
11

By imposing the restriction that β2 = −ρβ1 , this can be rewritten into a more convenient
form as equation (2.1).
R = ρW R + Xβ1 + W Xβ2 + e

(2.1)

Here, the sales ratio (R) will be the n × 1 dependent variable and a spatially lagged independent variable. The spatial lag matrix W is a n × n matrix with zeroes on the diagonal with
the non-zero elements designating neighboring jurisdictions and summing to unity on each
row. This is a first order contiguity matrix, so that the neighbors are defined as jurisdictions
that share borders with each other.4 The other regressors previously discussed that would
be expected to influence the level of the sales ratio an assessor chooses will be included in
the n × k matrix, X. At the county level within a state like Virginia, we would expect
that some of these county characteristics included in the X matrix would also present with
spatial dependence. Untreated this would show up as spatially dependent omitted variable
bias (Pace and LeSage, 2007) in the other coefficients, which motivates the inclusion of the
spatially lagged independent variables.5

The Spatial Durbin model first described in equation (2.1) is estimated here using
Bayesian econometric techniques. The full specification is defined in equation (2.2), where
the error term (e) has mean zero but a non-constant variance.6

4

The weight matrix was created using the xy2cont function in Matlab (Pace, 2003).
Prior to using the Spatial Durbin model, I estimated results using the Spatial Autoregressive model
(SAR) and the Spatial Error model (SEM). Estimates of the SEM specification demonstrated omitted variable
bias as the the coefficients on Xβ differed from that of OLS. This suggested that the SAR model was the
superior specification. However, the estimated spatial relationship in SEM was much larger than what was
reported in SAR, which suggested there was still further spatial dependence to be explained. This was
confirmed with the Spatial Durbin model and led to its application in this paper.
6
The notation here follows that used by LeSage (1999).
5
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R = ρW R+Xβ1 + W Xβ2 + e
e ∼ N (0, σ 2 V )
V = diag(v1 , v2 , . . . , vn )

(2.2)

ρ, β1 , β2 ∼ N (c, T )
r/vi ∼ ID χ2 (r)/r

The diagonal elements of V represent fixed but unknown parameters that are estimated
in the Bayesian regression and arranged in an independent chi-square distribution around r.
Several improper priors are defined in ρ, β1 , β2 , and r. For ρ, the parameter is a univariate
normally distributed variable while β1 and β2 are distributed multivariate normal. In order
to estimate equation (2.2), the following definitions of β1 and β2 in (2.3) are substituted into
(2.2).

e 0 X)
e −1 X
e 0R
β1 =(X
e 0 X)
e −1 X
e 0W R
β2 =(X

(2.3)

e =[X W X]
X
Following this substitution, the likelihood ratio for (2.2) is:

e =|In − ρW |σ −n exp{(e01 e1 − 2ρe02 e1 + ρ2 e02 e2 )}
L(β, σ, ρ, y, X)
(2.4)

e 1
e1 =R − Xβ
e 2
e2 =W R − Xβ

The improper priors are defined as
13

p(ρ) ∝ constant,
−1

p(σ) ∝ σ ,

−1 < ρ < +1
(2.5)

0 < σ < +∞

Assuming these parameters to be independent diffuse priors in the joint pdf:

p(ρ, σ) ∝ σ −1

(2.6)

According to Bayes’ Theorem, the product of these prior densities in (2.6) and the likelihood
function in (2.4) produces the posterior density:

p(ρ, β1 , β2 , σ|R, W ) ∝ |In − ρW |σ −(n+1) exp{−

1 0
(e e1 − 2ρe02 e1 + ρ2 e02 e2 )}
2σ 2 1

(2.7)

The integration of the above posterior distribution to achieve the posterior marginal
distributions for each of the parameters (i.e. p(βi=1,2 ), p(ρ), and p(σ)) are too complex to
allow for closed-form solutions. To bypass this problem, Gibbs sampling is employed which
repeatedly obtains random draws from the full conditional distributions for each parameter of interest given the other parameters. Specifically, the full conditional distributions
p(ρ|βi=1,2 , σ), p(βi=1,2 |ρ, σ), and p(σ|βi=1,2 , ρ) are sought. Derivations of the full conditional
distributions from the posterior distribution in equation (2.7) needed to begin this sampling are described in Lacombe (2007). The sampling procedure will see this chain of full
conditionals converge under weak regularity conditions.
The main philosophical difference here between the classical regression and the Bayesian
approach to parameter inferencing is that rather than view the data as random and the
parameters as fixed, the Bayesian approach treats the already observed data as fixed with
random model parameters that can be described as a distribution. As a result, there is no
need to make asymptotic assumptions regarding normality, the distribution of the parameters
is what will be determined during estimation.
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When estimated with maximum likelihood methods, the Spatial Durbin model has many
desirable characteristics such as immunity to spatially dependent omitted variable bias (Pace
and LeSage, 2007) as well as generally being less sensitive than OLS to other forms of
omitted variable bias (Brasington and Hite (2005); Dubin (1988)). The biggest threat to its
application in practice is its proclivity to multicollinearity (Anselin, 1988; LeSage, 1999).
For Bayesian estimation, correlation among the independent variables can possibly prevent
convergence in the parameter draws from occurring. Using the methods of Belsley et al.
(1980), multicollinearity was found to exist in the other three years prior to 2004, typically
in the reassessment lag variables with their spatial lag counterparts. Since I had difficulty
achieving convergence in those years, that multicollinearity was likely the impetus. This is
a limiting aspect of this paper, as the results may be year specific which creates a need for
future research to overcome this problem.
For testing for sources of political pressure, comparisons across states would be problematic as there is considerable heterogeneity in the level of accountability, certification standards, and legal authority of the assessors (Strauss and Sullivan, 1998).7 For this reason,
studying assessors in a state with a mixed system of both appointed and elected assessors
becomes appropriate. Very few states have a truly mixed system of assessor type, and even
those that do allow for it usually employ one type overwhelmingly or otherwise determine
it endogenously. For instance, New York has a mixed system but only allows for elected
assessors in the cases of very small villages or other smaller municipalities.
Virginia has several attractive characteristics for determining the factors that influence
the level of assessment. Virginia’s constitution allows for a district to choose its own assessor
type and as a result 48 of its 134 districts have appointed assessors, while the remaining districts leave the responsibility of maintaining assessment records to elected officials, typically
the Commissioner of Revenue.8 While few elected officials physically perform the assessments
7

It appears from observation of the tables presented in Strauss and Sullivan (1998) that states with
predominantly elected assessors have more accountability standards, but I will leave that issue to future
research.
8
I use the term district to refer to Virginia’s counties and independent cities. Over time, a city may
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themselves, instead opting to employ private firms, they are responsible for the provision of
final assessments as well as other important duties pertaining to the tax rolls and land books.
Virginia is unique in that the type of system chosen by a district is often written and
formalized into the individual district’s charter. Also there is no spatial or population size
relationship to the type of assessor the county employs in the case of Virginia. While
endogeneity of assessor type in Virginia cannot be definitively ruled out, it at least has no
obvious source. There is also precedence for using Virginia, as assessor type’s influence on
the COD has been studied in Bowman and Mikesell (1989) to estimate differences between
appointed and elected assessors.
The median sales ratio is reported in a study by the Virginia Department of Taxation
that samples arms’ length market sales of existing properties and comparing them to their
most recent assessment. A sales ratio less than 1.0 would suggest the property was underassessed while a value above would suggest overassessment. Virginia’s tax code stipulates
that assessors must demonstrate accurate assessment with sales ratios above 0.70 or else
the state may withhold the localities share of the states profits from the sale of alcoholic
beverages.9 Figure 2.1 provides a kernel density estimate of this ratio overlaid with a normal density distribution for comparison. Figure 2.1 demonstrates that Virginia assessors are
systematically underassessing property. In 2004, the year of study in this paper, it is clear
that both types of assessors were underassessing property as the average median sales ratio
for elected assessors was 0.755 versus 0.816 for appointed. Both the highest and the lowest
sales ratio came from a district with an appointed assessor.
However, most counties do not conduct annual reassessments, so in periods of housing
growth it could be that property has not been recently reassessed. Virginia’s tax code also
stipulates that reassessments may take place no less frequently than four years, with few
become independent from its county should its population reach a minimum point. Similarly a city may
be merged with its surrounding county if the population falls below a certain point. This happened most
recently in 2001 when Clifton Forge’s city status was downgraded to a town and merged into Alleghany
County.
9
Section 58.1-3259 of Virginia Tax Code.
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exceptions for very small districts that may have up to six years. The governing bodies of
these districts then pass local ordinances for their own frequency of assessment within that
constraint. In 2004, 35 of the 134 jurisdictions reassessed property in the year of the study.
Interestingly, districts with appointed assessors tend to have more frequent assessments. In
2004, the average reassessment lag for an appointed assessor was 1.1 years compared to 2.1
years for elected assessors. This paper corrects for such lags using fixed effects for year of
last assessment. Also, properties reassessed in the same year as the ratio study may still be
several months apart from the time of the sale if housing prices are rising quickly. This may
lead to misleadingly low sales ratios in fast growing districts such those near Washington D.C.
in northern Virginia. Since county level housing prices are not available during this period,
to control for such growth effects I follow Bowman and Mikesell (1989) and include the fouryear average annual population growth rate as a proxy variable. These controls should help
minimize any measurement error in the dependent variable that would otherwise inflate the
standard errors of the regressions.
If the assessor chooses a particular sales ratio, they likely would weigh the political pressure they receive from their constituency against the possible retaliation of withheld revenue
from the state.10 Therefore, district characteristics that would likely increase pressure on
the assessor to change the level of assessment will need to be included, in addition to the lag
fixed effects. Also a dummy variable indicating if the assessor is elected or appointed will
be included. The definition and sources for these variables are listed in Table 2.1 while their
descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 2.2.
The variables expected to be correlated with political pressure will include social and
economic characteristics of the districts. One of the most common independent variables in
the previous literature is the proportion of the population that is African American. To some
degree this dates the literature, as fractionalization has increasingly become the control for

10
It should be noted the Virginia has “Truth in Taxation Laws” that require the constituency to be told
that the assessors are not responsible for their tax burden, but rather just the assessment of their property.
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minority effects in political economy issues.11 Since there are several Virginia counties where
blacks are in the majority, I follow the suit of the contemporary literature and use racial
fractionalization calculated in the manner of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index where larger
values indicate a greater prominence of a single race. If assessors want to appease the state
comptroller with higher median assessments while trying to please the median voter with
lower valuations, then assessors might target minorities for higher assessments, in which case
the expected sign on fractionalization would be positive. To illustrate this intuition, consider
two districts, that differ in their racial fractionalization but are otherwise identical. Suppose
one county has an equal split of four races while the other county has a population that is 99
percent white, giving the former county a comparatively high racial fractionalization score.
An assessor in racially homogeneous county using race as a signal for preferences would likely
see whites as the median voter to be underassessed, allowing them to compensate that lower
assessment with higher assessments for the minority groups occupying the remaining one
percent. Whereas in the diverse county no race would be any more likely to contain the
median voter than any other, which would restrain the assessor from targeting any specific
group for overassessment.
Senior citizens over the age of 65 would also be prime candidates for underassessment for
several reasons. First, they are more likely to own their home and have paid off their mortgage
leaving the property tax as their primary “rent” expense. Secondly, they are less likely to
be earning income and thus do not reap any benefits from being able to deducting property
taxes. They are also stereotyped as being more prevalent and informed voters that are likely
to turn out on election day. Thus the intuition would be that the higher the proportion of
senior citizens in the population, the more pressure the assessor would face and contribute
to lowering the sales ratio.
The traditional view of high income households in the property tax assessment literature
11

For recent examples of fractionalization in the public economics literature, see Lind (2007) for an analysis
on higher fractionalization leading to lower redistribution levels and Alesina et al. (1999) for its influence in
reducing the provision of public goods.
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has been that voters with more income are better informed and educated about their property taxes and would likely pressure their assessors for more accurate assessments. While
this sits well with the uniformity literature, it is not as obvious of a translation into an argument for lower sales ratios because of the tax treatment of housing across income groups.
Higher income groups are more likely to itemize and accept the deduction of property taxes
from their taxable income whereas lower income groups are more apt to take the standard
deduction. Itemization means that a higher assessment is more fully realized in the lower
income groups than those of the higher because of its direct effect in the property tax bill.
For illustration, suppose two individuals each receive an increase of $100 in their property
taxes and that the first person itemizes while the second takes the standard deduction. If
the itemizer faces a marginal income tax rate of 35%, then their actual total decrease in
after-tax income is $65 = $100(1 − .35). The person taking the standard deduction, on the
other hand, sees their after-tax income fall by the full amount of the tax increase of $100. In
this scenario, it would seem plausible that the person taking the standard deduction would
be more likely to pressure for a lower assessment than the itemizer, ceteris paribus. Since
there are two countering income effects, the sign of income is ambiguous.
If assessors see commercial property as a means of exporting the property tax burden
to non-resident owners, then we would expect them to overassess that property relative to
resident-owned property (Johnson, 1989). The ratio study done by the Virginia Department
of Taxation provides a breakdown of the number of sales included that were commercial for
each jurisdiction. Including this as a share of the total number of sales for the jurisdiction
is included with the expectation that it will be positively correlated with the sales ratio.
If property owners are more sensitive to their assessments when they face a high nominal
property tax rate (Bowman and Mikesell, 1989), then we would expect it to have an inverse
relationship with the sales ratio. However, this is an issue that will require future research
because the true relationship may be more complicated because local officials in Virginia
are more apt to cutting the nominal property tax rate in periods of rising assessments.
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Additionally, a composite measure of fiscal stress provided by the Virginia Department of
Housing and Community Development is included as Lowery (1984) has found that fiscal
stress has had eroding effects on uniformity in assessment. We might expect to find local
politicians pressuring their assessors for higher levels of assessment as an alternative to raising
taxes when budgets are tight, in which case the sign for this coefficient would be positive.
A complication arises with using fiscal stress, as it is at least partially collinear with the
jurisdiction’s income and property taxes. To separate these effects, an auxiliary regression
reported in Table 2.1 with stress as the dependent variable while income and property tax
rate served as the explanatory variables. The residuals then would represent the fiscal stress
in a jurisdiction unexplained by and orthogonal to income and property taxes. Thus the fiscal
stress variable ultimately used in the estimation of the final results will be the residuals from
this regression.
In Lowery (1982) a spatial lag was viewed as a political “cuetaking” variable, but its
inclusion can be motivated by the visual spatial pattern that emerges when the median sales
ratio by jurisdiction is viewed in Figure 2.2. The map can be interpreted as the median
sales ratio of the district rising as it becomes darker. Clearly, there exists some kind of
spatial relationship in Figure 2.2 as similar ratios tend to cluster together. The dispersion
of the reassessment year fixed effects does not match the map in this manner. Part of the
explanation, particularly for areas in northern Virginia, would lie on spatial dependence in
property value growth. It is fairly intuitive to believe that there would be some spatial
dependence in the ratio itself. It is likely that a positive correlation would exist spatially
because residents would judge the accuracy of their own assessment level growth to that
of their neighboring counties. If their assessments rise while their neighbors do not, they
would be more likely to appeal to the assessor. It is also possible, albeit less likely, that
districts may engage in strategic property tax competition in a similar manner described
by Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). Regardless of the mechanism, the map in Figure 2.2
motivates the inclusion of a spatial lag of the dependent variable among the regressors.
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4

Estimation

The Matlab function sdm g from LeSage (1997) was employed to carry out the estimation
with the prior r value for the chi-square distribution of the diagonal elements of V set to four,
which seemed to be the value that best handled the heteroscedasticity. Convergence diagnostics set forth by Geweke (1992) confirmed that 100 omissions and 1,100 draws was more
than sufficient to reach convergence in the parameter estimates from the Gibbs sampling.
Additionally, the results were almost identical when the number of draws was increased to
5,100 and with the 1,100 omitted, further suggesting successful convergence. The final results
of the regression are reported in Table 2.3 and carry an R2 of 0.52. Remember that Bayesian
estimates describe the distribution of the parameter and are not point estimates. The reported statistics include the mean of the distribution and its standard deviation. Bayesian
distributions are rather definitive, and so statistical significance in the manner in which frequentists think of a parameter being “different from zero” does not apply. The Bayesian
p-level, reported in the last column of Table 2.3 represents the share of the β draws during
Gibbs Sampling that were zero or had the opposite sign of the mean. So a coefficient being
“significant” in a Bayesian sense means to have the draws having the same sign of the mean
a certain percentage of the time.
The posterior estimates in Table 2.3 indicate that even after controlling for other forms
of political pressure, elected assessors underassess their constituents property by a larger
amount than their appointed counterparts. The p-level effect is significant at the five percent
level, meaning that less than five percent of the draws contained in the distribution were
zero or positive in value. The mean of this coefficient is -0.04, which suggests that elected
assessors on average have a four percent lower level of assessment. The coefficient was
normally distributed with a standard deviation of 0.02. To put this number in perspective,
the 2000 Census reported Virginia’s median owner occupied house price to be $125,400, the
regression suggests that a given house of this value would receive a $5,016 lower assessment
from an elected assessor than an appointed one. According the Virginia Department of
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Taxation (2006b), the state nominal property tax rate in 2004 was $0.99 per $100 of assessed
value, meaning this lower assessment costs the state $49.66 in revenue for a home of that
value to elected assessor vote-seeking. Using the Virginia Department of Taxation’s county
aggregate estimates of real estate property, this vote seeking cost state and local governments
$52.1 million in 2004, approximately one percent of the $7.7 billion in total property taxes
it took in that fiscal year according to the Census.
The spatial lag of the sales ratio suggests that the behavior of neighboring assessors has
a considerable effect. Since the spatial weight matrix is row-stochastic, the interpretation
of the spatial lag coefficient is that a 0.1 decrease in the average sales ratio of neighboring
jurisdictions correlates with a 0.037 decrease in the home jurisdiction. Intuitively, it makes
sense that if your neighbors’ assessments rise then you would be more likely to accept that
all assessments are rising, including your own. Similarly, you would be less likely to accept a higher assessment if your neighbors’ property values were not raising under different
assessors.
One of the more interesting effects was the strength of the effect of business property,
as it initially seems to have the strongest direct effect on the sales ratio as assessors appear
to try and export the tax burden to non-residents. However, this is more than offset by the
spatial lag of the commercial property, as the greater the presence of commercial property in
a neighboring jurisdiction the lower the home jurisdiction’s assessments. I argue this reveals
an element of property tax competition among the jurisdictions, as the availability of nearby
commercial property enhances the ability of firms to exit when being overassessed. If firms
begin entering neighboring jurisdictions, say an increase in the share of all property by 0.1,
the sales ratio would fall by 0.189 in the home jurisdiction.
Interestingly, the community characteristics of racial fractionalization and the proportion
of the population over age 65 had the expected signs but had a insignificant share of its
distribution less than zero in absolute value. The median income, which as discussed was
ambiguous in its expected sign, was found to be positive and fairly significant, with 86 percent
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of the draws being greater than zero with a mean of 0.03. Higher income among neighbors
was nearly significant and negative, suggesting that higher incomes among neighbors will
lower assessments in the home jurisdiction. The intuition for this is may be a “keeping up
with the Joneses” effect where residents feel pressure to have similar levels of disposable
income. Higher nominal property tax rates appeared to have the opposite of the expected
sign, but was insignificant. Additionally, the presence of fiscal stress apparently spills over
into the assessors office in the need for higher assessments.
The controls for assessment-to-sale lags in time, population growth and year of last
assessment fixed effects), behaved in the expected manner for a period marked by rising
house prices. High population growth was negative and significant, while the year effects
(which are not reported but available upon request) become more negative as they move
away from the year of the study.

5

Discussion

This paper provides evidence that elected assessors are more responsive to political pressure
than their appointed counterparts with approximately four percent lower assessment-to-sale
price ratios. I estimate the cost of this behavior to Virginia in 2004 was approximately $52.1
million, or about one percent of its property tax revenue that year. There is also a significant
positive spatial correlation between neighboring assessors. It is likely that constituents look
to their neighbors’ change in assessment to judge the validity of their own assessment that
accounts for this relationship. Assessors also appear to try and export this tax burden to
commercial property but are severely restricted by competing with neighboring jurisdictions
for commercial property. Higher fiscal stress induces assessors to increase their assessments,
likely due to pressure from other elected officials.
There are several limitations that require future research before definitive policy recommendations can be advised. First, this analysis is based strictly on Virginia data and may
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not apply to other states that have different constitutional constraints on the assessors’ office. The methodology used is a Spatial Durbin Model is prone to multicollinearity issues
that restrict its application. In the case of Virginia, between the period of available data
from 2001 to 2004, only 2004 did not have multicollinearity in the reassessment year fixed
effects, which was likely the source of difficulty in achieving convergence in posterior estimates. Therefore, it is possible that the results are year specific and may not hold in other
periods. For instance, there may be election cycle effects and the effect may be stronger or
weaker depending on the proximity to an election year. The last election for Commissioner
of Revenue, who is usually responsible for assessments when an assessor is not appointed,
took place in 2002.
It also cannot be entirely ruled out that the assessor type is determined endogenously in
some manner. While there is no obvious link between population or space, there still may be
some underlying characteristic of the jurisdiction that makes them prone to elected assessors.
It may be that areas historically prone to strongly opposing taxes chose to implement an
elected assessor system as a constraint on their property taxes.
Another limitation of these results is a common one in the spatial econometrics literature
known as the boundary value problem (Anselin, 1988). This occurs when spatial dependence
exists to areas outside the area of analysis and creates spatially dependent omitted variable
bias. It is possible that assessors in Virginia bordering another state are influenced by their
assessment practices as well as their own in-state assessors. While several treatments have
been proposed, such as those in Griffith (1983), they tend to carry their own problems as
well (Anselin, 1988). The Spatial Durbin model’s insensitivity to omitted spatial dependent
variable bias likely limits this problem and if the nature of its omission reflects in the variance
of the disturbance term then it would have been picked up and corrected in the Gibbs
sampling.
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Figure 2.1: Kernel Density Plot of Median Sales Ratio (A/S)

Figure 2.2: Median 2004 Sales Ratio by Virginia District

25

Table 2.1: Variable Definitions and Source
Variable Name
Median Sales Ratio1

Assessor is Elected = 12
Racial Fractionalization3

Share of Population Over
Age 653

Definition
The median sales ratio of a jurisdiction. Sales ratio calculated by dividing the assessed value on the books of a
property and dividing it by the sale price in a fair market
transaction.
Indicator variable where a jurisdiction with an appointed
assessor takes a zero value, else takes a value of one.
Author’s calculation:
= (% White)2 + (% Black)2 + (% Asian)2 + (% Indian)2 +
(% Miscellaneous)2

=

Residents Age 65 & up in 2004
2004 Total Population

Income4

The 2004 median adjusted gross income on all state tax
returns.
Average Annual Populas
tion Growth, 2000-20043
2004 Population
= 4
−1
2000 Population
Share of Assessments
Commercial1
Nominal Property Tax
Rate1
Fiscal Stress4

The number of property sales classified as commercial divided total number of sales of all property types.
The total local real estate levies divided by the total taxable
real estate value.
The error term (ei ) from the regression:
Stressi = 1.90 − 0.14Incomei + 0.16N P T Ri + ei
(94.9) (−21.5)
(8.0)
2
R = 0.78

Last Reassessed in yyyy1

The t-statsitics are reported in the parentheses. Stressi is a
composite measure of revenue effort, revenue capacity, and
to quantatively measure the burdens of fiscal administration
in a district. Incomei and N P T Ri are the Income and
Nominal Property Tax Rate variables described above.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates ’yyyy’ was the year of
last assessment in sales ratio.

Sources: 1. Virginia Department of Taxation (2006b); 2. Author’s research with aid of Virginia Association of Assessing
Officers jurisdiction directory (www.vaao.org); 3. U.S. Census Bureau; 4. Virginia Department of Housing and Community
Development (2006a).
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable
Median Sales Ratio

Mean Std. Dev.
0.778
0.107

Min Max
0.433 1.006

Assessor is Elected = 1

0.642

0.481

0.000 1.000

Racial Fractionalization (tens. Thous.)

0.703

0.163

0.437 0.992

Share of Population over Age 65

0.146

0.042

0.052 0.296

Median Income (tens. Thous.)

2.766

0.776

1.758 5.989

Average Annual Population Growth, 2000-2004

0.010

0.017 -0.039 0.082

Share of Assessments Commercial

0.030

0.026

0.000 0.118

Nominal Property Tax Rate

0.790

0.241

0.370 1.420

Fiscal Stress

0.000

0.053 -0.311 0.176

Last Reassessed in 2003

0.209

0.408

0.000 1.000

Last Reassessed in 2002

0.224

0.418

0.000 1.000

Last Reassessed in 2001

0.164

0.372

0.000 1.000

Last Reassessed in 2000

0.119

0.325

0.000 1.000

Last Reassessed in 1999

0.015

0.122

0.000 1.000
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Table 2.3: Bayesian Spatial Durbin Model Posterior Estimates
Dependent Variable: Sales Ratio
Variable
W - Sales Ratio

Mean
0.37

Assessor is Elected = 1

-0.04

Racial Fractionalization
Share of Population over Age 65
Median Income
Population Growth

Std p-level
*** 0.12
0.00
0.02

0.01

0.04

0.10

0.33

-0.19

0.29

0.26

0.03

0.02

0.14

0.69

0.07

-1.01

**

*

Commercial Share of Assessed Units

1.62

*** 0.33

0.00

Nominal Property Tax Rate

0.05

0.05

0.17

Fiscal Stress

0.25

0.16

0.06

W - Assessor is Elected = 1

0.02

0.05

0.36

W - Share of Population African-American

0.01

0.13

0.50

W - Share of Population over Age 65

0.05

0.64

0.49

W - Income

-0.05

0.04

0.10

W - Population Growth

-0.92

1.79

0.31

W - Commercial Share of Assessed Units

-1.84

0.85

0.02

W - Nominal Property Tax Rate

-0.03

0.09

0.37

W - Fiscal Stress

0.42

0.51

0.21

Intercept

0.63

*** 0.22

0.00

*

**

Note: Bayesian p-levels are indicated as *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Year Effects and Spatial Year Effects not reported
but available upon request.
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Chapter 3
The Income Tax Responsiveness of
the Rich: Evidence from Free Agent
MLB All-Stars.
1

Introduction

Policy revolving around the taxation of the rich is frequently a topic of both positive and
normative debate.1 On the normative side, the issues of tax code progressiveness and tax
burden equity typically dominate the discussion of the appropriate income tax rate(s) that
the affluent should face. The role of economics has been to provide positive analysis with
both theoretical understanding and empirical evidence to the outcomes of policies that have
resulted from these debates.2 While there is a robust literature researching the effects of
income taxes in general, the area that has received much less attention has been the ability
of individual states to levy income taxes on the rich.
The traditional literature in public finance has been of the perspective that progressive
1

This essay is based on a collaboration with Robert Dunn that was published in the October 2007
Contemporary Economic Policy.
2
Slemrod (1998) provides a summary of both the positive and normative issues at hand in taxing the
rich.
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redistributional taxes by the state will be undermined by the ability of high-income earners to
exit their jurisdiction and be replaced by those from the lower end of the income distribution
(see Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). Yet we still observe a considerable amount
of taxation of the rich among the states. According to the Internal Revenue Service, 54.9
percent of the taxes due to state governments in 2004 were retrieved from individuals with
more than $200,000 in adjusted gross income.3 This is despite the fact that this group
represented just 2.3 percent of the tax returns and 45.3 percent of the total tax liability in
those states. Clearly this group serves as a very important component of the tax base of
a state, not to mention the role they likely play in the local economy. The fact that we
observe rich tax payers remaining in high tax states likely reflects heterogeneous preferences,
some mobility constraints, political economy issues, and some preference for redistributional
government.
Still, very little empirical evidence exists about the responsiveness of the rich to state
income taxes, with the only prior research to our knowledge being that of Bakija and Slemrod (2004). The primary reason for the empirical absence is likely the difficulties of data
pertaining to this group. The term ”rich” is rather arbitrarily defined in a relative context to
some group, and can vary considerably from person to person. A 2003 Gallup Poll reported
that to be ”rich” meant an annual income around $120,000 or $1 million in total financial
assets (Moore, 2003). Regardless of the actual cut-off point in determining this group, it is
by definition that they are small relative to the size of the population of interest. Empirically, this problem manifests as small sample sizes and few degrees of freedom available for
hypothesis testing. In addition to a lack of sufficiently large data sets, there are difficulties in
both observing their income and their true residence. Groups like business executives commonly accept alternative forms of payment, such as stocks, in addition to their salary that
makes it difficult to estimate their true income (Goolsbee, 2000a,b). Since it is possible for
the rich to own housing in multiple states, their reported residence and their true residence
3
These figures are based on authors’ calculations from data on state individual income tax statistics
provided by the Internal Revenue Service.
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may differ, resulting in difficulties estimating their state income tax responsiveness (Bakija
and Slemrod, 2004).
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on the state income tax responsiveness of the rich using data from Major League Baseball (MLB). Specifically, we use a
set of 235 free agent All-Stars who signed a contract to play on a U.S. team for the 1991
through 2002 seasons. Professional baseball players serve as an appealing target for estimating state income tax responsiveness because of some special treatment they receive from
state legislatures. Beginning in 1991, states around the country with professional sports
teams began implementing what are popularly known as ”jock taxes.” These were not new
taxes, but rather the states’ recognition that they frequently had millionaire nonresidents
earning income within their borders not paying taxes, and as a result they began to more
aggressively capture them as a tax base.4 As a part of this, players are considered residents
of the jurisdiction where their team is based or headquartered. Thus we can be reasonably
certain they negotiate their salary with the signing team’s state income tax rates in mind so
that our results are not sensitive to any difference between the true state of residence and
the reported residence. Secondly, there is a reasonably accurate reporting of their income,
as their salaries are well known and paid in cash form.
Table 3.1 lists the 20 highest paid players in MLB on U.S. teams for the 2002 season
sorted from highest to lowest gross income. The table demonstrates that state income tax
rates are very important to their net income, making it something they are likely taking into
consideration when negotiating with signing teams. For instance, while Sammy Sosa and
Barry Bonds had the same gross income, Sosa’s total tax bill was more than $600,000 lower
by playing in comparatively low-tax Illinois instead of California.
To estimate the state income tax responsiveness of free agent All-Stars, the player’s
signing salary is regressed on the net-of-tax rate as well as other player, team, and location
characteristics. Our least-squares estimate indicates that free agent All-Stars require a 3.3
4

For a full discussion of jock taxes, see Hoffman and Hodge (2004).
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percent higher salary for a one-percent decrease in the net-of-tax rate. This is significantly
greater than one at the ten-percent level. This result does appear to be sensitive to outliers,
as a quantile regression around the median revealed a lower estimate that was still greater
than one in absolute value, but was not statistically different from one. These results lend
credence to the traditional view in public finance that states will have difficulty implementing
progressive income taxes.

2

Literature Review

The question of tax incidence with respect to state income taxes has been addressed by
Feldstein and Wrobel (1998). Using wage data from the March Current Population Survey
(CPS) for the years 1983 and 1989, the authors find that state and local governments are
unable to redistribute income and conclude that any attempt needs to be undertaken at the
federal level or by a sufficiently large group of states.5 When interjurisdictional migration
is possible, gross, or pre-tax wages, will adjust to a change in state income tax until net, or
post-tax wages, are equal. While this adjustment has conventionally been recognized in the
long run, the authors find that adjustment is rapid over this time period and even short-run
effects of redistribution are very small. Additionally, changes in progressivity can result in
deadweight efficiency losses as resources are reallocated spatially. The cost of high-skilled
labor to firms will increase, reducing employment in this group, and the cost of low-skilled
labor will decrease, expanding the employment of this group.
Our paper most closely follows that of Bakija and Slemrod (2004), which estimates
aversion to high state taxes by the rich elderly using federal estate tax returns and a tax
burden calculator. They use a fixed-effects logit probability model where an individual
migrates to the state that provides the highest utility, and find that state income taxes are
estimated to have a significant negative correlation with the number of reported income tax
5
If the number of states raising income tax progressivity was large enough, individuals would have fewer
migration opportunities and pre-tax wages may not fully adjust.
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returns in that state. Specifically, they estimate the percentage decline in estate tax returns
for the state ranges from 1.5 to 2.7 percent given a one percent increase in the effective state
average income tax rate.6 However, as the authors note, the results depend upon the earnest
of the filer to report from their actual state of residence. Our data on MLB players overcomes
this problem because professional athletes are recognized as residents of the state in which
their team resides. The authors also provide an alternate, political economy, interpretation
of the Feldstein and Wrobel (1998) conclusion by suggesting that progressive state income
taxes may be a response to increasing wage inequality rather than a cause of the inequality.
Examining wage inequality more directly, Leigh (2005) employs an index of redistribution
based on the Gini-coefficient for the years 1977 through 2002 and does not find a statistically
significant relationship between more redistributive state taxes and pre-tax inequality. As
noted above, the expected increase in pre-tax wage inequality was suggested by Feldstein and
Wrobel (1998). However, Leigh’s evidence on the migratory behavior is mixed, and he finds
no evidence that total state personal income is negatively affected by a more progressive
state income tax. Finally, he reports limited evidence that states with more inequality are
likely to implement more progressive tax systems. This lends some support to the political
economy hypothesis of Bakija and Slemrod (2004).
Looking specifically at the migration literature, Linneman and Graves (1983) have established that the migration decision is affected by location specific characteristics such as
climate or state and local public finance. Using microdata from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY), Knapp and White (1992) show that individuals do respond to
state and local tax and expenditure policies when making a migration decision. Conway and
Houtenville (2001) conclude that elderly migrants are attracted to states characterized by
lower personal income taxes and lower death taxes. However, the magnitude of the estimates
are small and sensitive to model specification. Cebula (1990) finds that just the existence of
6

Bakija and Slemrod (2004) compute this tax burden using their own tax calculator that gives them
essentially the economic cost of the tax, which is the combined federal and state income tax liability as a
share of income, minus their income tax liability in a state without an income tax.
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a state income tax system may act as a deterrent to elderly in-migrants, and Saltz (1998)
reports similar findings for individuals between 20 and 40 years of age.

3

Data and Methodology

The motivation for the econometric model comes from the classic hedonic pricing model used
for differentiated goods. The suggestion is that teams located in less desirable environments,
particularly those with higher income taxes, will have to offer higher salaries to attract better
players. In essence, the teams’ demand for high-skill players is less elastic than the supply
of that talent, shifting the incidence of the tax burden onto the team. Therefore, letting
subscript i represent an observed transaction, a player’s salary (Yi ) will depend nonlinearly
on their own characteristics (Zi ), the signing team’s characteristics (Xi ), the location’s characteristics (Li ), and the relevant income tax rate (Ti ). The random error term ei reflects
the individual heterogeneity of team and player preferences in the transaction while D is a
vector of dummy variables and the constant term.

Yi = Tiβ Ziδ Xiγ Lρi exp[αD + ei ]

(3.1)

For the econometric specification, we take the log of equation (3.1). Letting the lowercase
letters represent the variables in equation (3.1) in their log form, and letting τi = ln (1 − Ti ),
we specify the model for estimation as:

yi = βτi + δzi + γxi + ρli + αD + ei

(3.2)

The coefficient of interest will be the net-of-tax rate elasticity, β, and will be interpreted
as the percentage increase in income required to compensate the player for a one percent
decrease in the net-of-tax rate for playing in that state. The actual specification of this tax
rate will be discussed shortly, but the expected sign of is negative if free agent all-stars
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require higher compensation to play in states with higher income taxes. The closer |β| is
to one, the more fully compensated the players are for the tax rate. If |β|> 1, then it
is interpreted that the players require compensation for non-baseball and capital income.
Therefore, it should be noted that non-salary income, such as endorsement contracts or
capital income, is not included in the current analysis.
Most of the player and team data is extracted from The Lahman Baseball Database,
Version 5.3, a commonly used source for studies that draw on MLB data.7 It is likely
that from the standpoint of the American public, even the lowest paid MLB player is rich.
However, what is needed for this study is to select players whose talents would give them
market power that is similar to that of the general rich population. Presumably, the general
rich population have a skill-set that allows them at least some flexibility in choosing where
to live. The desired group of MLB players we want to analyze have the power to negotiate
salaries, with the idea being that any team would be willing to sign them if the price was
right.8
Within the Lahman database, we were able to construct an indicator variable that signaled if a given player had ever been voted to play in an All-Star game at any point in his
career. This All-Star indicator was used to determine whether or not the player had any
bargaining power, as arbitrarily choosing a particular salary or performance statistic would
be more likely to lead to a sample-selection bias. For instance, a young promising player
may have some market power even if his performance statistics are low and similarly for a
player on the tail-end of his career.
This topic also brings up an important limitation of the use of MLB All-Stars as representative of the rich population. It may be expected that the labor supply of MLB All-Stars
to a state is more elastic with respect to taxes compared with the general rich population,
7

Recent examples of studies using the Lahman Database include Abel and Kruger (2006) and Bradbury
and Drinen (2006).
8
Ideally, we would like to have an estimate of the present value of the contract at signing. This is not
data available to us, but Slemrod (1992) has pointed out that empirically a snapshot of annual income is
not a bad representation of income averaged over several years and generally does not provide misleading
results.
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due to greater mobility among baseball players. Their baseball earnings are relatively frontloaded in their lifespan and concentrated in a small number of years. Players may be willing
to relocate temporarily to gain large rewards and move to a preferred location in retirement.
Additionally, the labor market for the MLB free agents is presumably better organized than
other markets for highly skilled labor to find available positions in alternative locations that
are close substitutes. Similarly, player performance is not constrained by agglomeration
economies that may affect other highly skilled workers, and spousal working decisions are
not likely to be an issue.9 According to the Current Population Survey (CPS) produced by
the Census Bureau, the probability of a interstate move from March 1990 to March 1995 by
individuals over age 15 and earning more than $100,000 in 1994 was 8.9 percent. By comparison, the probability that an All-Star MLB player in 1990 was playing in a different state
in 1995 was 47.6 percent. This heightened mobility of MLB all-stars will weigh against the
trade-off that players cannot easily choose alternative locations for reporting their residence.
The All-Star indicator variable was then merged with a list of free agent transactions
from 1991 into the 2002 season, which we used to exclude any player who was never on an
All-Star team. We then limited the list to include only non-pitchers because of the significantly different features of the position that make it an altogether different labor market (see
Hylan et al., 1996). This list was then merged together with the players’ previous season
performance statistics, as well as the signing teams’ previous season revenues and performance. Additionally, we added various other characteristics of the Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) the team resided in, such as population and housing prices. The resulting
dataset has 235 observations, for which the summary statistics are presented in Table 3.2
with the descriptions of the variables in Table 3.3.
The final variable to discuss is the state tax rate, which is a point of discussion. The
measure of the players’ tax rate is what we will refer to as the average tax rate, calculated
using NBER Taxsim (see Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) to estimate federal and state tax
9

We appreciate an anonymous referee’s contributions to some of the limitations of using MLB free agents.
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liability and dividing it by total income.10 This measure captures the interaction of state and
federal taxes since the taxes paid to the state are deductible from federal taxable income for
itemizers. The problem that arises from this is the average tax rate is an increasing function
of income, making it endogenous. To correct for the endogeneity, we created an instrument
variable (IV) that was the total tax burden from an arbitrarily high level of income that
was constant across players, states, and time.11 Since the deductibility of state taxes is a
sunk benefit in the location choice and the players have a high enough income that they
are located in the highest tax bracket, the correlation coefficient β should capture the effect
of differences in the state’s top marginal tax rate. Still, year dummies will be included to
capture spurious correlation from other changes in the tax code over the period.

4

Results

The estimation of equation (3.2) was carried out with an IV for the average tax rate in a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with robust standard errors. The estimation of
the first stage of the regression can be found in Table 3.4, while the results of the second
stage regression can be found in Table 3.5 with the robust standard errors reported in
parentheses.12
The first column of Table 3.5 reports final results of the IV with 2SLS and finds the
income elasticity to the net-of-tax rate to be -3.3 percent, which is significantly greater than
one in absolute value at the ten-percent level. The interpretation is that we are 90 percent
confident that a one-percent decrease in the net-of-tax rate will mean that players would
10

There is no Canadian counterpart to the NBER Taxsim model that we know of, and since we were
unable to devise a similar method to estimate an average tax rate for the Canadian provinces during the
time period, those players were dropped from the model. However, there were just 17 transactions between
Canadian teams and free agent All-Stars. The inclusion of their top bracket provincial marginal tax rate as
a proxy for their average income tax rate did not change the results in any significant way, and those results
are available upon request from the authors.
11
We choose $10 million as our arbitrarily high level of income to serve as the instrument variable. We
thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of this measure of tax rate.
12
In both Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the year dummies are not reported but are available upon request from the
authors.
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require a greater than one-percent increase in their salary to offset those higher taxes. The
second column of Table 3.5 demonstrates the results of a quantile regression around the
median observation in the second stage.
The philosophical distinction between classical linear regression and that of a quantile
regression lies the measurement of errors that the coefficients are to minimize. The least
squares minimizes the sum of the squared deviations from a mean that is a parametric
function of the data and the coefficient. The quantile regression on the other hand minimizes
an error function conditional on a choosen sample quantile, k, which is also a parametric
function of the observed data and a coefficient. Using the notation of Koenker and Hallock
(2001) this is expressed mathematically as

minp

β∈<

X

0

ρk (yi − xi β).

which can be estimated for any k ∈ (0, 1). Here ρk (·) is a piecewise linear and continious
loss function tilted around quantile k:

ρk (u) = u(τ − I(u < 0))

It is often simpler to think of this function graphically, as in Figure 3.1. A β conditional
on quantile k may be found as to minimize this function. If k = 0.5, the same number
observations will appear both above and below k, making it serve as the median. The
resulting estimate of β will be insensitive to outliers in that, if we were to double the value of
the maximum y, the coefficient that minimizes the above equation would remain the same.
While quantile regressions do not have a convenient looking closed form solution like oridnary
least squares does, the problem can be formulated into a linear programming model as:

min {k1Tn u + (1 − k)1Tn v|Xβ + u − v = y}

(β,u,v)
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0

The solution will be a β̂ where X will be non-singular and yi − xi β) = 0. At the locations
where this latter condition is true, the function has a directional derivative for all directions
in real space, and the function will be increasing in all directions if you were to move away
from β̂. Interestingly, this regression is interpolated on the obersations surrounding the
chosen quantile, with the number of observations being no smaller than the column rank
of X. Every observation in the sample is included in determining the location of k, thus
avoiding sample selection bias, but only those select observations at the quantile determine
the value of β̂.
The quantile regression indicates that estimation of equation (3.2) does appear to be
sensitive to outliers, which exist on both ends of the distribution of real salaries. While
the net-of-tax rate is still statistically different from zero at the five-percent level, it is not
statistically different from one. The remainder of the variables seem to take the expected
signs. Defensive put outs is positive and significant, as is the sum of on-base and slugging
percentages that is advocated by Hakes and Sauer (2006). Age takes the quadratic form that
indicates a turning point at approximately 27 years. While individually the coefficients on
the age variables are statistically insignificant, they are jointly significant at the five-percent
level in the IV/2SLS and at the one-percent level in the quantile regression. There also does
not appear to be significant barriers to signing with a new team, as the salary players are
willing to accept to stay with the same team is lower by a statistically insignificant amount.
We found the median house price served as the best proxy for amenities, and that players
do accept lower salaries in amenity rich states.13 It also seems that teams are willing to pay
slightly more for a player who was born in the state the team is located in. This is probably
capturing a marginal revenue effect where local fans would like to see former prep stars
return to the area and play professionally.
To control for teams that highly value a player’s marginal product the adjusted popula13
For a discussion of the use of housing price as a sole proxy of amenities, see Graves (1983) and Knapp
and Graves (1989).
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tion, the team’s previous year revenues and winning percentage were included.14 They were
consistent in having the expected signs but were significant in only the quantile regression.15
Cross-correlation and variance inflation factors did not indicate the presence of collinearity
between the three variables.

5

Discussion

The evidence provided here supports the traditional view of public finance regarding the
inability of states to redistribute income with progressive taxation on the rich. Since professional baseball players are largely incapable of hiding their salary income or reporting their
residence in a lower tax state, those players with a highly elastic labor supply will shift the
burden of the tax onto the teams and provide some insight into how strong this impact is
among the rich. According to our estimates, a one percent decrease in the net-of-tax rate
requires a 3.3 percent higher gross salary to sign a free-agent All-Star. This is significantly
greater than one at the ten-percent level, albeit that significance is sensitive to outliers as
evidenced by a quantile regression. These results complement the work on state taxation of
the rich elderly by Bakija and Slemrod (2004), in which they found the elasticity of higher
state income tax rates to reduce the number of federal tax returns filed from 1.5 to 2.7
percent, depending on the specification of the model.
It could still be true that a state could increase its total tax revenue from increasing the
marginal tax rate on the top income bracket, our results do not rule this out. To the extent
the results are representative of the general rich population, it suggests that states will bear
the larger share of the burden of deadweight losses from this form of taxation. Of course
there could be other factors to consider from a normative standpoint since the discussion of
14

We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting revenue to control for this effect.
Other variables were tested but found to be insignificant in controlling for the teams’ valuation of a
player’s marginal product. The revenue control appears to be driven by teams like the New York Yankees
and the Boston Red Sox. Without revenue, dummies for these teams were significant but the standard errors
were much higher across the regression. Once the revenue was included, these dummies and an interaction
term were insignificant. We also tried the age of the stadium and the stadium’s ball-park factor, which is an
estimate of how favorable the stadium is to batters, but in both cases were insignificant.
15

40

minimizing deadweight loss alone comes from a normative background (see Sandmo, 1998).
There are also some possible implications for MLB itself, as it seems from our results
that teams that are located in higher tax states are put at somewhat of a disadvantage in
the bidding process for the best players. This would be an important consideration in other
sports that have salary caps as a team in a high-tax state would not be able to purchase as
much free agent talent. It also would follow that different taxes across states would distort
the baseball player labor market since a team in a low-tax state could outbid another team
in a high-tax state even if their valuation of the player was lower.
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1
2
3
4
4
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
16
16
19
20

Team

Gross
Income

State
Marginal
Tax Rate
Rodriguez Alex
Texas Rangers
$22,000,000 0.00 %
Brown
Kevin
Los Angelos Dodgers
15,714,286 9.30
Ramirez
Manny Boston Red Sox
15,462,727 5.30
Bonds
Barry
San Francisco Giants
15,000,000 9.30
Sosa
Sammy Chicago Cubs
15,000,000 3.00
Jeter
Derek
New York Yankees
14,600,000 6.85
Martinez
Pedro
Boston Red Sox
14,000,000 5.30
Green
Shawn
Los Angelos Dodgers
13,416,667 9.30
Johnson
Randy
Arizona Diamondbacks 13,350,000 4.79
Maddux
Greg
Atlanta Braves
13,100,000 5.83
Walker
Larry
Colorado Rockies
12,666,667 4.77
Belle
Albert
Baltimore Orioles
12,368,790 4.75
Williams
Bernie
New York Yankees
12,357,143 6.85
Vaughn
Mo
New York Metts
12,166,667 6.85
Jones
Chipper Atlanta Braves
11,333,333 5.83
Bagwell
Jeff
Houston Astros
11,000,000 0.00
Gonzalez Juan
Texas Rangers
11,000,000 0.00
Mussina
Mike
New York Yankees
11,000,000 6.85
Piazza
Mike
New York Metts
10,571,429 6.85
Giami
Jason
New York Yankees
10,428,571 6.85

Name

$8,466,384
5,659,014
5,806,145
5,400,670
5,731,468
5,393,463
5,254,519
4,828,007
5,036,169
4,888,891
4,777,528
4,665,555
4,561,051
4,490,358
4,226,188
4,220,384
4,220,384
4,057,362
3,898,303
3,845,283

Federal
Liability
$0
1,459,274
818,999
1,392,845
449,879
999,517
741,475
1,245,595
637,647
763,116
603,869
587,142
845,882
832,834
660,106
0
0
752,917
723,560
713,774

State
Liability

$13,533,616
8,595,998
8,837,583
8,206,485
8,818,653
8,207,020
8,004,006
7,343,065
7,676,184
7,447,993
7,285,270
7,116,093
6,950,210
6,843,475
6,447,039
6,779,616
6,779,616
6,189,721
5,949,566
5,869,514

Net
Income

Table 3.1: Income Tax Burden of 20 Highest Paid Players on U.S. Teams in 2002

1
4
2
6
3
5
7
10
8
9
11
12
13
14
17
15
15
18
19
20

38.48%
45.30
42.85
45.29
41.21
43.79
42.83
45.27
42.50
43.15
42.48
42.47
43.76
43.75
43.11
38.37
38.37
43.73
43.72
43.72

N.I. Average
Rank Tax Rate
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Variable
Real Signing Salary
Effective State Marginal Tax Rate
Average Tax Rate
Tax Instrument Variable
Put Outs
On-Base+Slugging Percentage
Age
Age2
Re-Signed with Same Team = 1
Signing Team located in Birth State=1
Lagged Signing Team’s Revenues (mills)
Lagged Signing Team’s Winning Pct
MSA’s Median House Price
Adjusted MSA Population

N
Mean
235 $2,773,129
235
0.06
235
0.41
235 $4,264,271
235
252
235
0.759
235
33.5
235
1,132.8
235
0.3
235
0.1
235
$84.8
235
0.509
235
$149,741
235 4,797,333

Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
$1,874,022
$124,140 $9,624,601
0.03
0.00
0.11
0.04
0.26
0.47
$339,449 $3,094,464 $4,719,885
344
0
1,458
0.136
0.125
1.137
3.5
25.0
46.0
244.0
625.0
2,116.0
0.4
0.0
1.0
0.3
0.0
1.0
$36.1
$26.6
$207.6
0.071
0.327
0.716
$58,087
$73,705
$384,130
3,255,051 1,449,760 13,155,584

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics

Table 3.3: Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Name
Real Signing Salary1

Description
The player’s real salary in the first year with the signing
team. Salary deflated to 2000 dollars with personal consumption expenditures chain-type price index from the St.
Louis Fed.
2
Average Tax Rate
Federal tax liability plus state tax liability divided by gross
income.
Tax Instrument2
The federal plus state tax burden on $10 million in income.
1
Put Outs
A put out occurs when a defensive player is involved in
preventing a player from safely reaching a base.
On-Base + Slugging On-base percentage is the sum of hits, walks, and hit-byPercentage1
pitches divided by the sum of at-bats, walks, sacrifice flies,
and hit-by-pitches. Slugging percentage is total bases divided by at bats.
1
Age
Year of transaction minus year player was born.
Re-Signed with Same Dummy variable where one indicates the signing team and
Team1
the previous team were the same, else zero.
Signing Team Loacted in Dummy variable where one indicates the signing team is
Birth State 1
located in the same state the player was born in, else zero.
Lagged Signing Team’s The signing team’s total revenues for the previous season in
Revenues4
millions of 2000 dollars, deflated with personal consumption
expenditures chain-type price index from the St. Louis Fed.
For the 1994 season, a hypothetical estimate from Financial
World that assumed no strike was used.
Lagged Signing Team’s The signing team’s percentage of games won in the previous
Winning Pct1
season.
Median House Price of The median house price of an owner-occupied housing unit
Team’s MSA3
for the MSA the team is located in as reported by the 2000
Census. This price was then extrapolated over the timeseries using the MSA housing growth rates from the OFHEO
and then deflated to 2000 dollars with personal consumption expenditures chain-type price index from the St. Louis
Fed. This method was also employed by Bakija and Slemrod
(2004).
Team’s
Adjusted The adjusted population is calculated by taking the popuPopulation5
lation of the MSA and dividing it by the square root of the
number of teams in the MSA, as used in Hylan et al. (1996).
4
Free Agent transactions
Free agents were not limited to six-year free agents or to
those awarded free agency by an arbitrator.
Data Sources: 1) The Lahman Baseball Database, Version 5.3; 2) NBER Taxsim Version
5.1 (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). 3) Median House Price: U.S. Census Bureau; House Price
Index: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. 4) Doug Pappas, Business of Baseball
Committee. 5) U.S. Census Bureau
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Table 3.4: First Stage Least Squares Estimates
Dep: ln (1 − Average Tax Rate)
Tax Instrument IV

Coefficient s.e.
p-value
-1.890 *** 0.129 0.00

ln (Put Outs)

-0.004

***

ln (On-Base Pct + Slugging Pct)

-0.047

*** 0.010 0.00

Age

-0.006

0.008 0.48

Age2

0.001

0.001 0.45

Re-Signed with Same Team = 1

-0.005

0.005 0.32

Signing Team located in Birth State=1

-0.001

0.007 0.89

ln (Lagged Signing Team’s Revenues)

-0.007

0.009 0.44

0.001 0.00

ln (Lagged Signing Team’s Winning Pct)

0.038

**

0.018 0.04

ln (Median House Price of Team’s MSA)

0.024

**

0.009 0.01

ln (Team’s Adjusted Population)

-0.004

Time Trend

0.002

Constant Term
Sample Size
R2

-4.192
235
.7747

0.004 0.28
*

0.001 0.10
2.662 0.12

Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant 10%. Year Fixed Effects not reported but available upon
request.
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results
Dep: ln (Real Signing Salary)
ln(1-tax rate)
ln(Put Outs)
ln(On-Base Pct + Slugging Pct)
Age
Age2
Re-Signed with Same Team = 1
Signing Team located in Birth State=1
ln(Lagged Signing Team’s Revenues)
ln(Lagged Signing Team’s Winning Pct)
ln(Median House Price of Team’s MSA)
ln(Team’s Adjusted Population)
Time Trend
Constant Term
Sample Size
R2

IV/2SLS
Quantile
-3.3497 **
-1.2011 **
(1.45)
(0.59)
0.1181 ***
0.1199 ***
(0.02)
(0.01)
0.6904 *
0.8580 ***
(0.37)
(0.09)
0.1295
0.0817
(0.15)
(0.07)
-0.0024
-0.0015
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.0118
-0.0579
(0.11)
(0.04)
0.1451
0.2432 ***
(0.16)
(0.06)
0.1742
0.1716 **
(0.16)
(0.08)
-0.3489
-0.6599 ***
(0.37)
(0.16)
-0.5198 ***
-0.2777 ***
(0.19)
(0.07)
0.0768
0.0812 **
(0.08)
(0.03)
0.0572 **
0.0615 ***
(0.03)
(0.01)
-99.4828 *
-109.2985 ***
(0.07)
(21.83)
235
235
.4879
.2261

Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant 10%. Year Fixed Effects not reported but available upon
request.
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Figure 3.1: Quantile Regression Loss Function
ρ τ (µ)

1−τ

τ
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Chapter 4
Tenure Choice, Location, and the Tax
Treatment of Housing.

1

Introduction

While income taxes and the tax treatment of housing are aspatial in design, they carry spatial
implications. Our intention is to develop a theoretical model that combines the location
decision with tenure choice and incorporates the preferential tax treatment of ownership with
the additional costs of maintaining the property. While each of these key characteristics maintenance costs, tax treatment, tenure choice, and location - have been explored in-depth
by previous literature our model is the only one we are aware of that examines the interplay
between them all. This model allows us to draw several spatial implications by comparing
the conditions of our results with what is observed in reality.
There are several manners in which U.S. policy treats housing differently from all other
assets and goods. Both mortgage interest and property taxes are deductible from federal
taxable income, and owner-occupiers are not taxed on their imputed rent income. Additionally if you sell your house at a profit you may be exempt from the capital gains tax,
but not so if you come out ahead when selling shares of your mutual fund or IBM stock.
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This special treatment of housing has received much of the blame for the trend of increased
suburbanization and urban sprawl over the last several decades (Gyourko and Voith, 1997).
Additionally, the progressive tax system in place increases the incentive for those in the
higher tax brackets to purchase larger and more expensive homes. This creates an arbitrage
opportunity for a low-income family to sell their home to a landlord in a high-income tax
bracket who then could rent it back to them at a lower rate by sharing some of their incremental tax savings. Empirical support for this low-to-high income housing market tax
arbitrage has come from Narwold (1992) and Narwold and Sonstelie (1994).
These attributes of housing and their differential treatment in the tax code have recently
led others to observe the spatial distribution of these housing subsidies (via tax savings).
Gyourko and Sinai (2003) estimate the distribution of housing subsidies over space and
discover that the largest beneficiaries are concentrated within a few Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs). These authors find that 87.3 percent of the net-benefits to metropolitan areas
are concentrated in just five locations. For instance, Gyourko and Sinai (2003) single out
the Honolulu, HI MSA as the largest beneficiary at $12,362 in benefit per owner, whereas
the McAllen-Edinberg, TX MSA is the lowest at $745.1 When Gyourko and Sinai (2003)
compare central city census tracts to all other census tracts, housing subsidies represent a
net transfer from the cities to the suburbs in the order of $18.2 billion.
Many models of tenure choice between renting and owning include an analysis of taxation.
However, tenure models tend to be in a asset-portfolio context (e.g. Henderson and Ioannides,
1983). The models that do look at the decision of where to rent and where to own usually
assume some type of externality, regulatory constraint, or credit market imperfection that
entices the wealthy households to own in the suburbs and poor households to rent in the city.
This is the observational reality in the pattern of income residence and has been described
by Rosenthal (2006). While these assumptions fit with our notions regarding the practice
of zoning, it assumes that these restrictions are binding in some way, holding back some
1
Gyourko and Sinai (2003) identify these five areas are Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County, New YorkNorthern New Jersey, San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, Boston-Worcester-Lawrence, and Washington, D.C.
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underlying forces that the previous literature has not modeled. For instance, Gyourko and
Voith (1997) examine the impact of subsidies on decentralization and residential sorting along
income lines. The workers have identical preferences for numeraire consumption, housing,
and location-specific exogenous amenities but have idiosyncratic preferences for suburban or
urban location. They also assume that the city location is fully developed and is therefore
inelastic in housing supply, while the suburb has an elastic supply of housing. The effect of
the subsidy then is to increase city rents and entice some households of both high and low
income to relocate to the suburbs, hence no sorting effects manifest among income groups.
In their extension, sorting only occurs in this model when binding zoning constraints are
introduced that exclude low-skill workers.
Yet it is likely that zoning is endogenously determined by risk-averse homeowners (Fischel, 2001a) and it could be that this pattern would emerge even without such restrictions.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the share of housing units that are occupied by renters by census
tract in Houston, Texas. The shading of the figure is such that the darker the shade, the
higher the concentration of rented units. Houston appears to take the same pattern observed in every other U.S. city, with the concentration of rented units declining as you move
toward further into the suburbs. For comparison, Figure 4.2 demonstrates the same scale
the share of renter occupied units for another Texas metropolitan area, Austin. Indeed,
Houston has not been spared from urban sprawl, and a lack of zoning restrictions has not
induced an abundance of suburban rental property. Admittedly, Houston is just a single
observation and there may be other policies to substitute zoning to mimic this appearance.
The Houston example does demonstrate the need to provide a theoretical underpinning for
zoning restrictions that would keep poor-renters in the city and rich-owners in the suburbs
a binding one.
We will present a model in which bid-rent functions are compared for a representative
agent among two locations, the city and the suburb. The agent may rent or own, but
they incur maintenance costs when owning and transportation costs when living in the
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suburbs. In equilibrium, household utility must be equal at all locations for all tenure choices
with prices adjusting to eliminate any utility differentials. This model is analogous to the
traditional monocentric city model approach with bid-rent functions for modeling consumer
demand in that we have homogeneous preferences by using a representative agent. This
also ignores potential life-cycle effects that create differences among households. Eventually
these issues can receive theoretical attention in an extension of the model, and they do receive
acknowledgement in the empirical estimation. Such an extension might use distributions of
agents that exist along a continuum of different preferences or carry different preferences in
each period of the life-cycle.
We also follow the monocentric approach by treating the supply of housing as naively
producing the type of housing for which consumers offer the highest per-foot price. As
previously discussed, the supply-side may have growth controls, zoning, or a variety of factors
influencing it at any given time. Once a better understanding of consumer demand in the
spatial-tenure choice is gained, the supply of housing may have firms operating in different
market types or face legal constraints.
The next section derives the theoretical model and will be followed with a section providing estimates for a multinomial logit regression on spatial tenure choice before concluding.

2

Theoretical Model

The model in this section is a variant of the work by Hoff and Sen (2005). A city consists of
a central business district (CBD), which is the only employment center, and the suburbs. A
generation of households moves into the city at the beginning of each period and moves out
at the end of the period. The number of households in each generation remains constant.
A household with income y residing in the suburbs has a disposable income y − τ , where
τ represents commuting costs. Households are identical except for their current endowed
income y, distributed across households according to the distribution function F (y), where
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y ∈ [y, y]. In the second period, all households have identical income w.
Households derive utility from the consumption of a numeraire good and from housing.
Housing units are ex-ante identical at both the CBD and suburbs, and provide one unit
of housing quality. All housing units are owned by real estate companies. Households can
either purchase a housing unit from a real estate company by paying the price β, or they can
rent it afterwards for ρ. Once households decide whether to become a renter or owner, they
determine the amount of effort they will spend on improving the quality of the house. Let
q denote the level of “home improvement”, then the utility derived from housing in the first
period is v(1 + q), with v 0 > 0, v 00 < 0. The cost of exerting effort is captured by the function
c(q), with c0 > 0, c00 < 0. In period two, the housing unit depreciates by γ, which means that
the quality level ends up being (1 + q − γ), so that the value of the house is β(1 + q − γ).

2.1

Homeowner’s Problem

As in Hoff and Sen (2005), the utility function employed throughout the analysis specifies
a minimum consumption level, set at zero, below which the utility becomes unboundedly
low. Given β, each household chooses a level of home improvement a, and borrowing b, to
maximize the utility



y − τ x − β + b + [v(1 + q) − c(q)]



uo =
+δ{w(1 − t) − [1 + r(1 − t)]b + β(1 + q − γ)}, if y − τ x − β + b ≥ 0;




 −∞,
otherwise,

(4.1)

where δ is the common discount factor, and x = 1 if the household resides in the suburbs and
x = 0 otherwise. Suppose that housing depreciation after one period is γ = 1. Additionally,
assume that θ ≡ δ[1 + r(1 − t)] − 1 > 0. Thus, there are two possible cases: (i) if y − τ x ≥ β,
then there are no incentives to save, i.e., b = 0; and, (ii) if y − τ x < β, a household has
to borrow b = β − (y − τ x) > 0 for subsistence. Note that the amount borrowed is fully
employed to pay for the housing unit.
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The optimal level of q is implicitly defined by

duo /dq ≡ v 0 (1 + q) − c0 (q) + δβ ≤ 0,

q ≥ 0,

(duo /dq)q = 0.

(4.2)

Equation (4.2) defines q o ≡ q o (β, δ). At an interior solution, it is straightforward to obtain
∂q o /∂β > 0.
Hence, as a homeowner, a household obtains the following utility



y − τ x − β + v(1 + q o ) − c(q o ) + δβq o + δw(1 − t), if (i) y − τ x − β > 0;



uo =
(4.3)
v(1 + q o ) − c(q o ) + δβq o




 +δ{w(1 − t) − [1 + r(1 − t)][β − (y − τ x)]},
if (ii) y − τ x − β < 0.

The rest of the analysis focuses on case (ii), i.e., a situation where disposable income in
the first period is not enough to pay for the full price of the house, in which case a homeowner
would need to borrow b = β − y − τ x.

2.2

Renter’s Problem

As a renter, the household utility becomes

ur = y − τ x − ρ + v(1 + q r ) − c(q r ) + δw(1 − t),

(4.4)

where q r is implicitly defined by

dur /dq ≡ v 0 (1 + q) − c0 (q) ≤ 0,

q ≥ 0,

(dur /dq)q = 0.

(4.5)

Throughout the analysis, we assume that q r = 0, i.e., renters do not find it optimal to put
any effort in improving the quality of the house.
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2.3

Locational Equilibrium and Tenure Choice

The goal is to find the equilibrium values of β and ρ at the CBD and in the suburbs. In
equilibrium every household should be indifferent between residing at any location. Letting
uoc denote the utility of a homeowner at the CBD and uos the utility of a homeowner in the
suburbs, in equilibrium

ūo = uos = uoc .

(4.6)

From (4.6), we obtain β(y, t, δ, τ ; x), with βc ≡ β(y, t, δ, τ ; 0) and βs ≡ β(y, t, δ, τ ; 1). The
variables βc and βs represent the maximum price households are willing to pay to become
owners at the CBD and suburbs, respectively.
A similar result holds for households that decide to become renters. Renters are indifferent between renting a house at the CBD or in the suburbs if

ūr = urc = urs .

(4.7)

In order to satisfy (4.7), we should have

ρc = ρs + τ.

(4.8)

At the same time, in equilibrium, households should also be indifferent between owning
or renting at all locations, i.e.

uoc = uos = urc = urs .

(4.9)

Our goal is to find the equilibrium values of βc , βs , ρc , and ρs that satisfy these conditions.
However, the previous equations only determine a set of three independent conditions. Thus,
we can arbitrarily fix the value of one of the unknowns. In this case, we fix the value of ρs ,
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and express βc , βs , ρc in terms of ρs .
Recall that real estate companies own all housing units throughout the city. They will
sell or rent each unit to the household type that offers the highest bid. When a household
offers to buy the house, the real estate company will receive β in the first period. As a renter,
a household is willing to pay ρ in the first period, but the real estate company retains the
housing unit which has a value equal to βq r . Thus, when the unit is rented, the real estate
company receives ρ + δβq r . Under the present assumptions q r = 0 because renters provide
no maintenance that offset depreciation, so the real estate company ends up receiving ρ.
In conclusion, real estate companies will sell their properties if β > ρ, and rent them if
β < ρ. Moreover, this decision rule applies for real estate companies that own housing units
at both the CBD and in the suburbs. From the previous equilibrium conditions, we obtain
the following results:

βc = ρc + D(βc ) − θ(βc − y),

(4.10)

βs = ρs + D(βs ) − θ(βs − y − τ ),

(4.11)

ρc = ρs + τ,

(4.12)

where

D(β) ≡ [v(1 + q(β)) − c(q(β)) + δβq(β)] − v(1) ≥ 0.

(4.13)

Expression (4.13) reflects the difference between the utility a homeowner obtains when housing quality is increased by q(β) and the utility that a renter obtains from a housing unit
with quality 1.
On one hand, a household becomes a homeowner or a renter at the CBD (respectively,
suburbs) depending on the relative values of βc and ρc (respectively, βs and ρs ). Specifically,
units will be sold to a household located at the CBD if D(βc ) > θ(βc − y). In other words,
when the net benefits of homeownership at the CBD, given by D(βc ), outweighs the net cost
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of borrowing the amount (βc − y), a household will be willing to pay a higher price as a
homeowner than as a renter. In the suburbs, on the other hand, housing units will be sold
to households residing there if D(βc ) > θ(βc − y − τ ), in which case βs > ρs .
How are the previous results affected when income y rises? By differentiating (4.10), (4.11),
and (4.12) with respect to y, we obtain
∂βc
θ
=
,
∂y
θ + 1 − δqco
θ
∂βs
=
,
∂y
θ + 1 − δqso
∂ρc
= 0.
∂y

(4.14)
(4.15)
(4.16)

The previous results suggest that the likelihood of becoming a homeowner increases as income
goes up at both the CBD and suburbs. However, βc and βs do not increase uniformly with
y.

3

Empirical Review

In order to gain a richer empirical context to our theoretical model, an examination of
available data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is
undertaken. The concentration of the housing subsidy by high income groups living in
the suburbs can be examined using data from HUD’s 2001 Residential Finance Survey of
Owners (RFS). The survey includes vital information for obtaining a reasonable estimate
of an individual’s tax liability and allows us to calculate the amount of the subsidy per
household. The survey gathers data regarding personal characteristics of the owner and
their family, income sources, mortgage details, property taxes, and location within an MSA
(city, suburbs, rural area). We were able to run this data through the NBER Taxsim model
(Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) to obtain estimates of state and federal tax liabilities. By
running these individuals through Taxsim a second time, this time setting their mortgage
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and property tax payments to zero we obtain an estimate of their projected tax liabilities
without the option of deductibility. Differencing these two estimates we are able to obtain the
total subsidies to these individuals for choosing ownership, the results of which are presented
in Table 4.1. While this of course makes the naive assumption that these households would
not change their asset holdings if they did not own property, it gives us a picture of how the
housing subsidy is directed among income groups and location.2
As can be seen in Table 4.1, it is clear that the subsidy is concentrated to the higher
income groups living in the suburbs. Of all federal tax savings in the sample, 81.3 percent
went to households with more than $100,000 in income, and 82 percent of that money is
located in the suburbs. Meanwhile, low-income homeowners tend to stick to the standard
deduction and thus receive little of the subsidy, particularly in the rural areas. The table is
consistent with the claims made by critics of the subsidy, mainly that it primarily encourages
existing homeowners to purchase larger and more expensive homes as well as propagate urban
sprawl.
What we cannot glean from the Residential Finance Survey is significant insights into
the tenure choice decision, as those surveyed have already made the decision to own. To
examine this issue, we turn to the 2004 American Housing Survey of Metropolitan areas.
This survey covers 13 Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA) and includes both
owners and renters of property in addition to many of the income, household, and housing
characteristics. They also encode in the 2004 survey whether the household being surveyed is
located in the urban or suburban area of the MSA, which allowed us to construct a indicator
variable of spatial tenure choice: Own in the city, own in the suburb, rent in the city, or rent
in the suburb. This indicator variable will serves as the basis for a random utility logistic
regression.3
2

While state tax treatment of housing is taken into consideration by the Taxsim model, the state tax
savings from housing are not reported here since the manner in which housing is treated may vary.
3
We have been directed by a number of reviewers to consider the American Community Survey (ACS)
as an alternative. While the ACS data has a number of advantages, unfortunately for our purposes it lacks
our most critical variable: the households’ location (city, suburb, rural).
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For the AHS of 2004, the Census Bureau interviewed 62,005 households across 13 PMSAs. For the empirical analysis we excluded observations with missing values for location
(city/suburban), PMSA, and other important demographic characteristics (income, race,
marital status, age, educational attainment) as well as those living in mobile homes. The
demographic characteristics were based on the attributes of the person who was assigned
“head of household” status. Since we ultimately choose to use a random utility model, we
had to exclude those households residing in the two PMSAs that occupied more than one
state (Memphis and St. Louis). Had we included them, their behavior may have been distorted by having different state-level tax treatment options for housing in the suburbs. This
still left us with a total of 26,553 observations, whose breakdown according to spatial tenure
choice is demonstrated in Table 4.2. From the table it can be seen that roughly two-thirds
of those interviewed remaining in our final sample owned their housing unit and resided in
the suburbs. Descriptives of the variables to be used in the regressions are listed in Table
4.3, while the specifics of their definition and source can be found in Table 4.4.

To examine the factors that influence the spatial tenure choice decision we employ a
random utility model where it is assumed that living in any mixture of the four possible
spatial tenure choices within a PMSA yield to households some positive level of utility. It is
then assumed that households chose the observed outcome based on the expectation that it
would yield the highest level of utility among the four choices. This utility level for household
i in spatial tenure choice j can be viewed in a random utility model as

Uij = xi βj + Li γj + ij

(4.17)

where xi is the individual characteristics of household i and Li are the MSA specific characteristics faced by household i. Reformulating this into the observed behavior, yij , to be
regressed in a multinomial logit econometric model, the probability of a household choosing
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spatial tenure choice j over reference choice k as:

P (y = j|x, L) = xi βj + Li γj + eij =

exp(xβj )
PJ
1 + k=1 exp(xβk )

j = 1, 2, 3

(4.18)

Equation (4.18) is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation on

ln L =

3
n X
X

dij ln P (y = j).

(4.19)

i=1 j=1

where dij is an indicator set equal to one if the individual chooses j and zero if not. Numerical
methods can find the β vectors that satisfy the derivatives of equation (4.19). The log-odds
0

ratios ln Pj /P0 = βj xi are then reported in Table 4.5. The reference case (j = 0) here is
renting in the city, so that each of the columns report the change in the log-odds that a
household will choose the spatial tenure choice reported in the column header over renting
in the city. The intercept here reflects a non-white, non-black, unmarried household in the
Seattle PMSA that does not have at least a bachelor’s degree and occupies the lowest federal
marginal income tax bracket in 2004. The coefficients best deserving of attention in Table
4.5 are the income tax bracket indicators, of which the top five of the six federal tax brackets
are reported. These indicators give us a more complete picture of the income and tax effects
at play in the model.4
By interpreting income tax bracket coefficients our intention is to recall equations (4.14)
through (4.16). These equations illustrate the modeled response to increases in income were
not uniform for owning across location and had no impact on renting. Contrasting these
predictions with observed empirical differences will help motivate future modeling of the
spatial tenure choice decision.
The log-odds ratios become positive and significant for changing spatial tenure choice
from renting in the city to any other choice starting in the third income tax bracket. Inter4
See Table 4.3 for complete descriptions of the variables. Attempts to include income as an interaction
variable to the bracket dummies were tested for inclusion, but were insignificant.
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estingly, within a spatial tenure choice, the income effect of moving up a tax bracket seems
to peak in the fifth bracket. The sixth bracket, those with more than $316,100 in gross income, seem to be indifferent between renting in the suburbs or the city. As for the remaining
variables listed in Table 4.5, they seem to take the expected sign when one clearly exists.
It should be noted that there is no clear sign of property tax rate following from the
theoretical literature regarding spatial expansion of the city (see Brueckner and Kim, 2003;
Song and Zenou, 2005). Here, the effective property tax rate of the MSA seems to discourage
moving to the suburbs, but the calculation of this variable includes the suburban areas. The
theoretical literature typically deals with property tax rate in the city. Some surprising signs
emerge, as having a bacherlor’s degree increases the probability a household will own in
the city, but decrease the probability they will live anywhere else. However, being married
increases the probability of owning and locating to the suburbs. Larger household size seems
to suggest a push towards renting in the city over all other locations, but it is not clear
what this means. The dataset is not clear if the household size is composed of children or of
roommates to the household head.
Interpretation of the coefficients in a multinomial logit regression is difficult across the
different choices when they are all related to a reference case. In order to gain a bit clearer
interpretation of their impact on the probability of making a given choice, the marginal effect
of a change in x on the predicted probability value is calculated using the formula:
3

X
∂Pj
= Pj [βj −
Pk βk ] = Pj [βj − β̄]
∂xi
k=0

(4.20)

The reports of these calculations for the income tax brackets are demonstrated in Table
4.6. Notice that horizontal summation across the columns of the coefficients sum to zero, the
intuition of which is that an increase in the probability of choosing one location reduces the
probability of choosing another. Again, the variables of primary interest to the theoretical
model are the changes in the household tax bracket. The marginal effect of each bracket
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reported in Table 4.6 are in reference to locating in the first income tax bracket. To compare
the marginal effects to the theoretical model’s equations (4.14) through (4.16), we could
restate them in terms of probabilities. According the equations, an increase in income will
raise the bid-rent price for owning in both the city and in the suburbs, thus enhancing
the probability that we will observe them at that location. It necessarily follows then that
increasing income decreases the probability of renting at either location.
What we can glean from this table is the income tax bracket a household in a given
spatial tenure choice is likely to belong to. For illustration, these coefficients are plotted in
Figure 4.3 for each spatial tenure choice. We can see that the probability of owning is greater
than renting as income increases beyond the second tax bracket. However, neither owning
in the suburbs or the city is increasing monotonically. We can see that owners locating in
the suburbs are least likely to come from the second income tax bracket, and most likely to
come from the fourth bracket. Though it should be noted that the drop in probability of
owning in the suburbs is statistically insignificant in the second tax bracket.
While all marginal effects are statistically insignificant, we can also see that increasing
income to the second bracket increases the probability of owning in the city but decreases
the probability of owning in the city. Figure 4.3 illustrates a bimodal distribution of income
for owners living in the city, as they are most likely to come from the second or the fifth
income tax bracket. They are least likely to come from the middle income groups, hitting
the minimum in the fourth income tax bracket.
In order to validate the use of the multinomial logit regression, a Hausman test was conducted over the results to test the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption.
In essence, this assumption stipulates that excluding one spatial tenure choice should not
affect the probabilities of locating in another. This is done by eliminating a possible choice
comparing the new multinomial logit results to Table 4.5. Statistically significant differences
in the coefficients and standard errors in a χ2 distribution rejects the null hypothesis of a
satisfied IIA assumption. Since the result can be sensitive to the choice of reference case,
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we repeated this exercise with each location having a turn as the reference case for a total
of 12 test statistics. In 11 of those 12 tests, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of
a satisfied IIA condition.
Regardless of an absence of statistical evidence, it seems intuitively unlikely that if we
were to exclude the possibility of choosing one spatial tenure choice, that it would not affect
the probability to choose another. So as a measure of robustness we treated the spatial tenure
choice as a sequential problem where the location and the tenure were made in an order.
Following a logit regression on the first decision, we split the sample according to households
that made that choice and conducted another logit regression on the second choice. For
example, in Table 4.7 we treated the own or rent decision as the first choice and computed
the marginal effects over the full sample, the results of which are presented in first column.
We then split the full dataset into two separate sets of renters and owners and conducted
another regression to examine the proclivity to locate in the suburbs. In the second column,
we have the marginal effects of choosing to locate in the suburbs conditional on the renter
dataset, while the third column is conditional on the owner subset.
The results in Table 4.7 seem to support the previous findings. In the third column
representing the results conditional on having owned, those locating in the suburbs were
most likely to have come from the fourth bracket, and least likely to have come from the
second bracket, the same outcome as in Figure 4.3. It also suggests that the owners living
in the city were most likely to have come from the lowest two brackets and the fifth, just
as in the previous results. Renters, however, do not as clearly follow the previous results.
Conditional on having chosen to rent, a household is most likely to have come from the fifth
tax bracket in Table 4.7, rather than the second bracket in Table 4.6. In fact, the income
effect appears to be rather strong among renters until the sixth bracket.
The marginal effects for treating the location decision as the first choice are reported in
Table 4.8, with the second and third columns conditional on the location choice. Owning in
the suburbs continue to have consistent results, as they are most likely to be drawn from the
62

fourth income tax bracket and least likely to be drawn from the second. Owners in the city,
rather than coming from the first and fifth bracket, tend to be drawn from the third, fourth,
and fifth income tax bracket. City renters are still likely to be coming from the first tax
bracket, and suburban renters from the second. Collectively, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 generally
support the earlier findings in Table 4.5 and conclude that if the IIA assumption is being
violated, it is not wrecking havoc on the multinomial logit results.

4

Discussion

Our intention has been to provide a baseline theoretical model of the spatial tenure choice
decision, that is, the joint decision of where to live and whether to own. In doing so, we
accounted for trade-offs in maintenance costs, transportation costs, and tax-savings in a two
period model. Much of the previous literature has relied on exogenous zoning constraints or
special suburban amenities that result in income sorting by spatial tenure choice. While this
view fits with many subjective observations of reality it is possible that these factors were
endogenously determined by this sorting. If this is the case, then reliance on assumptions
of binding zoning constraints or amenities to result in sorting are unwarranted, as sorting
would occur anyway.
By comparing our baseline model, which makes no such assumptions that bind specific
household types to locations, to empirical observations we can gather insights as to what
manner of constraints may be binding. Our theoretical model seems to suggest that the
effect of increasing income should be much stronger for increasing the bid-own price in the
city, and thus should make rich owners more prevalent in the city. Along the same lines,
this should concentrate housing subsidies in the city, whereas our estimates from the 2001
Residential Finance Survey of Owners suggests subsidies are distributed more heavily to the
suburbs.
The extensions from this model will deal in trying to explain the observational reality of
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the spatial tenure patterns. Our intention is to endogenize the constraints such as zoning,
property taxation, and amenities that are usually taken as given to achieve such sorting
effects.
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Figure 4.1: Houston (TX) Share of Renter-Occupied Units in 2000
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Figure 4.2: Austin (TX) Share of Renter-Occupied Units in 2000
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Table 4.1: Distribution of Federal Housing Subsidy Dollars by Income Group and Location.

Income Group
Under $20,000
$20,000 to $40,000
$40,000 to $60,000
$60,000 to $100,000
Over $100,000

City
Suburbs
Rural
Sample Mean Sample Mean Sample Mean
263
1.16
450
1.08
139
0.11
403 16.22
772
3.39
182
0.00
336
9.20
850 26.98
156 12.56
358 89.78
1,288 129.08
143 11.76
269 643.41
1,000 847.61
74 174.27

Notes: Subsidy calculated using NBER TAXSIM 5.1 by differencing the amount if this taxpayer was a renter from their actual
tax burdens. Data Source: 2001 Residential Finance Survey of Owners, HUD.
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Table 4.2: Distribution of AHS 2004 data by Spatial Tenure Choice.
Spatial
Tenure
Choice

Income
Tax
Bracket

# of
Obs.

Own CBD

Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Total

1
2
3
4
5
6

296
1,396
2,537
801
254
130
5,414

Own SBD

Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Total

1
2
3
4
5
6

779
3,541
8,548
3,453
1,207
471
17,999

4.33
19.67
47.49
19.18
6.71
2.62

2.93
13.34
32.19
13.00
4.55
1.77
67.79

Renter SBD

Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Total

1
2
3
4
5
6

160
771
828
123
32
10
1,924

8.32
40.07
43.04
6.39
1.66
0.52

0.60
2.90
3.12
0.46
0.12
0.04
7.25

Renter CBD

Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Bracket
Total
26,553

1
2
3
4
5
6

146
584
418
50
5
13
1,216

12.01
48.03
34.38
4.11
0.41
1.07

0.55
2.20
1.57
0.19
0.02
0.05
4.58

N
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Percent
of Spatial
Tenure
Choice
5.47
25.79
46.86
14.79
4.69
2.40

Percent
of N

1.11
5.26
9.55
3.02
0.96
0.49
20.39

Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Mean Std. Dev.
Own
0.882
0.323
Rent
0.118
0.323
City
0.250
0.433
Suburbs
0.750
0.433
bracket 1
0.052
0.222
bracket 2
0.237
0.425
bracket 3
0.464
0.499
bracket 4
0.167
0.373
bracket 5
0.056
0.231
bracket 6
0.024
0.151
Property Tax Rate
11.044
4.486
At Least a Bachelor’s Degree
0.355
0.479
White
0.855
0.352
Black
0.089
0.285
Married
0.636
0.481
Household Size
1.083
1.279
Age
49.834
15.689
Age2
2,729.570 1,688.170
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Table 4.4: Variable Definitions and Source
Variable Name
Own1
Rent1
City1
Suburbs1
bracket#1

Property Tax Rate2
At
Least
Degree1
White1

Bachelor’s

Black1

Married1
Household Size1

Age of Household Head1

Definition
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the housing unit is owned
by its residents, else 0.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the housing unit is rented
by its residents, else 0.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the housing unit is located within the central city of the metropolitan area.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the housing unit is located in the suburbs of the metropolitan area.
Dummy variable to indicate the federal income tax bracket
of the household according to gross household income. If the
resident is married, is assumed to file as head of household.
The effective property tax rate per $1,000 of property value
in the metropolitan statistical area.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the head of household
has at least a Bachelor’s degree or more, else 0.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the head of household
identifies themselves as a member of the caucasian race.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the head of household
identifies themselves as a member of the African-American
race.
Dummy variable where 1 indicates the household head is
married, else 0.
The number of residents reported to live as a member of
the housing unit minus the household head and spouse (if
applicable).
Age reported as of last birthday at the time of the survey.

Sources: 1. The 2004 American Housing Survey of Metropolitan Areas, U.S. Census Bureau; 2. National Association of Home
Builders;
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Table 4.5: Log Odds Ratio Coefficients for Spatial Tenure Choice.
Own CBD
Own Suburbs
Intercept
-1.614 *** -0.553 *
(0.351)
(0.335)
bracket2
0.091
0.044
(0.124)
(0.118)
bracket3
1.190 ***
1.272 ***
(0.127)
(0.121)
bracket4
1.991 ***
2.169 ***
(0.190)
(0.185)
bracket5
2.922 ***
2.976 ***
(0.471)
(0.467)
bracket6
1.055 ***
1.124 ***
(0.321)
(0.313)
Property Tax Rate
0.017 *
-0.123 ***
(0.009)
(0.009)
At Least Bachelor’s Degree= 1
0.489 ***
0.258 ***
(0.086)
(0.084)
White= 1
-0.098
0.324 **
(0.135)
(0.131)
Black= 1
-0.544 *** -1.708 ***
(0.154)
(0.152)
Married= 1
0.873 ***
1.266 ***
(0.072)
(0.070)
Household Size
-0.140 *** -0.135 ***
(0.025)
(0.024)
Age of Household Head
0.025 *
0.043 ***
(0.013)
(0.012)
Age2 of Household Head (100s)
0.034 **
0.016
(0.014)
(0.013)
Pseudo R2
0.20
N
26,553
Log Likelihood Ratio
-19,480.3

Rent Suburbs
0.154
(0.381)
0.211
(0.135)
0.470 ***
(0.139)
0.583 ***
(0.215)
1.397 ***
(0.502)
-0.639
(0.446)
-0.077 ***
(0.012)
-0.349 ***
(0.100)
0.116
(0.149)
-1.298 ***
(0.176)
0.234 ***
(0.082)
-0.061 **
(0.027)
0.007
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.015)

Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant 10%. MSA specific Fixed Effects not reported but available
upon request.
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Table 4.6: Marginal Effects of Tenure and Location Choice.

bracket2 (∆1)
bracket3 (∆1)
bracket4 (∆1)
bracket5 (∆1)
bracket6 (∆1)

Own in City
0.005
(0.011)
-0.001
(0.011)
-0.011
(0.012)
0.003
(0.015)
0.000
(0.019)

Own in
-0.012
(0.013)
0.058
(0.012)
0.083
(0.012)
0.059
(0.016)
0.055
(0.019)

Suburbs

***
***
***
***

Marginal Effects are computed for a discrete change from zero to one.
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Rent in
0.008
(0.005)
-0.037
(0.005)
-0.051
(0.003)
-0.044
(0.003)
-0.044
(0.004)

Suburbs

***
***
***
***

Rent in
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.020
(0.002)
-0.020
(0.002)
-0.018
(0.001)
-0.011
(0.002)

City

***
***
***
***

Figure 4.3: Marginal Effects for Spatial Tenure Choice by Income Tax Bracket
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Table 4.7: Marginal effects of logitistic regression with tenure-location sequence.

bracket2 (∆1)
bracket3 (∆1)
bracket4 (∆1)
bracket5 (∆1)
bracket6 (∆1)

P (Own)
-0.004
(0.005)
0.061 ***
(0.005)
0.073 ***
(0.003)
0.064 ***
(0.003)
0.053 ***
(0.004)

P (Suburbs|Rent) P (Suburbs|Own)
0.046
-0.004
(0.033)
(0.012)
0.115 ***
0.011
(0.033)
(0.012)
0.134 ***
0.023 **
(0.042)
(0.012)
0.257 ***
0.007
(0.048)
(0.015)
-0.241 **
0.012
(0.121)
(0.018)

Marginal Effects are computed for a discrete change from zero to one.
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Table 4.8: Marginal effects of logitistic regression with location-tenure sequence.

bracket2 (∆1)
bracket3 (∆1)
bracket4 (∆1)
bracket5 (∆1)
bracket6 (∆1)

P (Suburbs)
0.003
(0.011)
0.033 ***
(0.011)
0.047 ***
(0.011)
0.034 **
(0.014)
0.022
(0.018)

P (Own|City)
0.019
(0.013)
0.119 ***
(0.014)
0.121 ***
(0.008)
0.121 ***
(0.006)
0.079 ***
(0.013)

Marginal Effects are computed for a discrete change from zero to one.
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P (Own|Suburbs)
-0.012 *
(0.006)
0.042 ***
(0.006)
0.057 ***
(0.004)
0.048 ***
(0.003)
0.047 ***
(0.004)

Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation has addressed various spatial issues in public finance. The policies examined
in each essay progressed among the level of government in ascending order - from the local
assessors, to state income taxation, and finally to the federal tax treatment of housing. The
manner in which space was influential was completely different for each of the three essays.
For property tax assessors, it is demonstrated in Chapter 2 that their constituents likely
use the level of assessment in neighboring areas to guide their expectations regarding how
their own assessments should change. Among the Virginia counties, this translates into
spatial dependence in the Assessment-to-Sales price ratio. If the average sales ratio among
neighboring counties falls by 10 percent, there will be an accompanying 3.7 percent decline
in the home districts’ sales price ratio. This is the first work on assessor behavior that I am
aware of that correctly controls for such spatial autocorrelation.
The use of the spatial Durbin model also controlled for spatial dependence in the independent variables. This revealed one of the more important and interesting insights of
assessor behavior with respect to assessing commercial property. If assessors view commercial property as being held by non-residents, then they may try and maintain their mandated
assessment levels by overassessing business property and underassessing residential property
held by local voters. In the estimation of the model, the presence of commercial property
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led to much higher assessments. However, mobility serves as a binding constraint on this
behavior. The presence of commercial property available in neighboring counties lowered
assessments and more than offset the tendency to increase them in the presence of own
commercial property. Intuitively, it follows that if local firms could easily move to property
available in neighboring counties, then attempts to export the property tax on them via
higher assessments would result in firms’ relocating across borders.
In Chapter 3, the income tax responsiveness of the rich to state income taxes is estimated.
Highly skilled workers are likely to be very mobile, and not find space to serve as severe of
a constraint as their lower skill counterpart. Therefore, attempts to capture additional tax
revenues at the state level with progressive income taxes may suffer from severe deadweight
losses. By estimating this response using professional athletes, we were able to overcome
some survey biases that the previous literature had to accept. Since these types of citizens
are capable of having multiple homes, they can live and work in one state but claim residency
in another for tax purposes. Since professional athletes are required to file their tax claims
out of their team’s headquarters, we can get a good fix on their true response to income
taxation.
The estimates conclude that free agent MLB All-Stars require a 3.3 percent higher gross
income for a one percent decrease in their net-of-tax rate. This is significantly greater than
one at the ten-percent level. The regression does appear to be sensitive to outliers, as a
quantile regression around the median revealed a lower estimate that was still greater than
one in absolute value, but was not statistically different from one. This evidence suggests
that the working rich population is unlikely to bear the burden of progressive taxation,
thus hindering the ability of the state to capitalize on mobility constraints and redistribute
income. We also find no statistically significant evidence MLB players are willing to accept
lower wages for resigning with the same team, further suggesting that mobility is a weak
constraint. This lends credence to the traditional view in public finance that states will have
difficulty implementing progressive income taxes.
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A further spatial implication of these findings that could warrant future research is if the
burden of progressive state income taxation falls on firms, then we should see firm aversion
to personal as well as corporate income taxes. This would not be evidence of a principleagent problem with executives trying to duck higher tax burdens, but a profit maximizing
approach to high-skill labor management.
In the third essay, presented in Chapter 4, a theoretical framework is developed that will
allow for the study of the spatial distribution of housing subsidies, among other things. The
model suggests that even in the case of a flat income tax a spatial concentration of housing
subsidies would begin to manifest itself. However, the observed concentration of subsidies is
in the suburbs (see Table 4.1) while the model seems to suggest that it should be occurring
in the city. This runs counter to the popular claim that the mortgage interest deduction by
itself encourages urban sprawl. Also, empirically we do not observe a monotonic relationship
with spatial tenure choice decisions and income, which the theoretical model predicts.
Much of the previous literature has made use of assumptions that force the observational outcome of high income groups sorting into the suburbs as owners and low income
groups sorting into the city as renters. The differences between our theoretical and empirical
outcomes in spatial tenure choice and the distribution of housing subsidies provide strong
motivation for future extensions that can endogenize these assumptions. Additionally, we
plan extend the model to reflect the progressiveness of the U.S. income tax code.
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